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Preface
This is a collective submission of evidence by scholars from the Centre for 
Science and Security Studies. It draws on the diverse technical and regional 
expertise at the Centre to examine various facets of global nuclear diplomacy 
and how they relate to the United Kingdom. 
The submission is divided into separate essays each addressing a specific topic 
and written by a single author. The views presented in each essay belong solely 
to the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Centre for 
Science and Security Studies or the other contributors in this collective 
submission. When citing ideas in this work, please include the name of the 
essay’s author . 
The essays are clustered into two parts. The first part reflects on broad themes 
and trends influencing global nuclear diplomacy and highlights opportunities for 
UK action and leadership. Essays in the second part situate the UK within a 
specific regional or international nuclear context. Essays in that part examine 
developments in US-Russian arms control, China, the Middle East and South Asia 
as well as exploring UK’s role in nuclear diplomacy post-Brexit.
Hassan Elbahtimy
Centre for Science and Security Studies
War Studies Department
King’s College London
London, 18 January 2019
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3About the Centre for Science and Security Studies
King’s College London
The Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) is a multi-disciplinary 
research and teaching group that brings together scientific experts with 
specialists in politics, international relations and history. CSSS forms part of the 
School of Security Studies at King’s and draws on experts from the Department 
of War Studies and the Department of Defence Studies. Members of the Centre 
conduct scholarly and policy-relevant research on weapons proliferation, non-
proliferation, verification and disarmament, nuclear security, space security and 
mass effect terrorism including the CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear) dimension. In addition to academic staff, CSSS host masters and 
postgraduate research students, as well as visiting fellows and associates drawn 
from the academic, government and business sectors.
Three Masters Programmes are run within CSSS, an MA in Science and Security 
(launched 2005), an MA in Non-Proliferation and International Security. 
(launched 2012) and an MA in Arms Control and International Security 
(launched 2016). A significant emphasis is also placed on engagement with 
industry, government and international organisations, and the wider 
dissemination of research findings through interaction with the media. These 
activities include executive education and specialised professional development 
courses for practitioners with a focus on supporting the implementation of 
nuclear security measures and efforts to counter proliferation-related trade.
The Centre organises conferences and hosts a regular seminar series where 
internal and external speakers address issues related to science and security. 
For forthcoming events check the War Studies and CSSS events web pages.
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7Current Challenges Facing Global Nuclear Diplomacy 
Dr Sarah Tzinieris
1. Despite progress on disarmament at the end of the Cold War, great power 
competition is resuming on the world stage. In recent years, a number of 
nuclear weapon states (US1, UK2, France3 and Russia4) have included 
statements in their security doctrines about strengthening their nuclear 
arsenals. New nuclear programmes take decades to become operational, 
indicating that the nuclear weapon states are committed to maintaining the 
status quo. 
2. We have moved away significantly from the policy dialogues of the Cold War 
period – especially the 1960s and 1970s – where nuclear weapons were a 
persistent issue generating a great deal of fear. Yet, in reality the salience of 
nuclear weapons has never been greater in view of technological advances in 
weapons and the volatile state of global politics. In practical terms, 
international diplomacy and trade negotiations between states almost always 
ignore the issue of nuclear weapons. Whilst this is a more conducive 
approach to achieving results, the absence of discussion on disarmament 
within international forums reduces pressures on central government over 
their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems. In most cases, discussions about 
nuclear weapons are siloed into the defence ministry and do not feature in 
broader international dialogues. 
3. Over the past decade, great power rivalries between the US and Russia and 
between the US and China have intensified and led to a series of hostile 
encounters and geopolitical flashpoints, especially in the Korean peninsula, 
South China Sea, Ukraine and Syria. The relentless modernisation by these 
states of nuclear capabilities and their delivery systems is exacerbating 
tensions on the international stage. John F Kennedy’s adage that we live 
under a sword of Damocles which is capable of being cut at any moment by 
accident, miscalculation or madness5 is more salient today than it ever has 
been since the Cold War ended.6
4. Following the optimism heralded at the end of the Cold War, the subsequent 
impasses on disarmament have led to dismay amongst various non-nuclear 
weapon states and civil society groups. Many believe that provisions in the 
NPT on ‘good faith’ obligations7 have not been sufficient to commit nuclear 
weapon states to disarmament. 
5. The more that advances are made in the modernisation of nuclear arsenals, 
the more that questions are being asked in other parts of the world about the 
commitment of nuclear weapon states to disarmament. The NPT was 
premised on a ‘grand bargain’ that non-nuclear weapon states would forego 
nuclear weapons forever, whilst the select few already possessing nuclear 
1 US Government, US Nuclear Posture Review (January 2018). 
2 UK Government, UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (November 2015). 
3 République Française, Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017 (October 2017). 
4 Russian Federation, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2014 (29 June 2016); also see statements by President Vladimir Putin on 1 
March 2018 (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43239331). 
5 John F Kennedy, address before the UN General Assembly, New York (25 September 1961). 
6 For a list of incidents of near nuclear use and their implications, see Patricia Lewis, Benoit Pelopidas, Heather Williams and Sasan Aghlani, Too 
Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, Brookings Institute Press (2015)
7 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (1 July 1968). 
8weapons would commit to eliminating theirs. However, lack of progress over 
disarmament – with modernisation programmes simultaneously underway – 
appears to be consolidating the status quo, where a select few ‘nuclear 
haves’ indefinitely retain their arsenals. The grand bargain, built on trust and 
good faith, is increasingly perceived as a fragile construction.
6. Modernisation confers some important benefits such as risk-reduction and 
improvements in the safety of nuclear weapons, making them less prone to 
accident or malfunction. However, these benefits are rarely the principal 
motivation for modernisation programmes; rather, it is the belief by nuclear 
weapon states that they must develop and maintain an arsenal to assure 
their national security. Non-nuclear weapon states and civil society groups 
are becoming increasingly wary of attempts to frame modernisation 
programmes in disingenuous ways.8 
7. Profound differences in perceptions about arms control are continuing to 
complicate diplomatic efforts on nuclear disarmament. At the heart of the 
problem, policy makers in nuclear weapon states (especially the US and 
Russia) tend to take an approach to arms control that focuses on narrow, 
technical constraints on military capabilities. Such arms control theories rely 
on implicit assumptions about how deterrence works, which unavoidably 
extends to making assumptions about the intentions of other nuclear weapon 
states. Policy makers meanwhile assume that other states are reasoning from 
the same ‘first principles’, when in fact there might be crucial domestic issues 
or other constraints that mean such threat perceptions are misaligned. As 
well as inhibiting diplomatic progress, there is a risk of nuclear escalation. 
8. The entanglement of nuclear weapons with non-nuclear weapons, as well as 
their equivalent C3I capabilities9, heightens the risk of an inadvertent global 
nuclear war – even where a conflict may have been initiated over local or 
regional issues. The dangers in entanglement are increasingly recognised in 
the West, but less so in Russia and China due to entrenched assumptions 
that any escalation is calculated rather than inadvertent. The risk of 
entanglement is heightened with the growing capability of non-nuclear 
weapons to threaten dual-use C3I assets, such as US early-warning 
satellites. 
9. The increasing propensity of states to penetrate the cyber systems of other 
states heightens the risk of a nuclear attack where hacking and cyber attacks 
extend to nuclear arsenals and C3I assets. The problem is extensive and all 
nuclear weapon states are tied up in these practices – and therefore must 
take responsibility for the creation of these new ‘norms’. Whilst such assets 
are usually equipped with ‘air gaps’, an adversary intent on entering a 
system may be able to exploit it (as demonstrated by the Stuxnet attack).10 
Given the high stakes, governments should acknowledge accountability and 
accord the issue urgency within global nuclear diplomacy. 
8 See for example, Reaching Critical Will, ‘NPT News in Review’, Vol. 15, No. 6 (6 May 2018); Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom, ‘Assuring Destruction Forever: 2018 Edition’ (April 2018). 
9 For more on this subject, see James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises 
the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International Security, Vol. 43, Issue 1 (summer 2018). 
10 For more on this subject, see Andrew Futter, Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, Georgetown University Press (10 April 
2018). 
9The Relevance of the NPT for Global Nuclear Diplomacy 
Dr Sarah Tzinieris
1. Above all, the NPT has near-universal acceptance and adherence within the 
international community. Negotiated 50 years ago last year, the NPT has the 
highest number of state parties of any nuclear treaty and represents the 
main forum for negotiations on disarmament and non-proliferation. Equally 
important, it is the only treaty containing the obligation to disarm to which 
five of the world’s nuclear-weapon states – crucially, including the US and 
Russia – have acceded. As such, the NPT continues to be recognised as the 
cornerstone of global nuclear governance.  
2. Yet operating as, arguably, a ‘lowest common denominator’ has its 
drawbacks. The NPT has failed to deliver on aspirations of a nuclear-free 
world and instead instituted a two-tier hierarchy of leverage – with the 
nuclear-weapon states inherently privileged over the non-nuclear weapon 
states owing to their hegemony over disarmament. The NPT has also been 
unable to manage nuclear relations effectively in some key regional theatres, 
leading to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, East Asia and South Asia. 
Nevertheless, the NPT continues to have a unique appeal. It represents the 
triumph of multilateralism and global collective action to mitigate 
transnational risks arising from nuclear weapons. 
3. Many states argue that the NPT requires a re-balancing of the relative value 
assigned to the three pillars. The P5 have long prioritised the non-
proliferation pillar but, since the initial momentum at the end of the Cold 
War, progress has ceased on the disarmament pillar. For this reason, some 
observers argue that the NPT confers legitimacy for nuclear weapon 
possession;11 certainly, the NPT has served to preserve the status quo with 
regard to the privileged status of the P5. The continuing lack of leverage for 
non-nuclear weapon states has created widespread disillusionment, although 
this has not yet reached a level that would see any serious abandonment of 
the NPT process by signatories. 
 
4. The NPT’s sanctioning of a two-tier hierarchy works through the international 
community more broadly, most evidently reflected in the structure of the UN 
Security Council and the corresponding veto powers of the P5. 
Notwithstanding the politics around the nuclear weapons themselves, the NPT 
retains a crucial role within international affairs – and indeed mirrors and 
reinforces the existing structures of global governance. 
5. The implicit hierarchy between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states encapsulated within the NPT renders the treaty incapable of 
unconditionally delegitimising nuclear weapons. This does not necessarily 
result in lack of relevance for the NPT – and few states would argue this – but 
it does create an absence in multilateral treaty provisions on the issue of 
delegitimacy. This gap is something that the new ban treaty, for all its 
controversy, categorically serves to fill. 
11 For example, Nick Ritchie, ‘Legitimizing and Delegitimising Nuclear Weapons’, in John Borrie and Tim Caughley (eds.) Viewing Nuclear 
Weapons Through a Humanitarian Lens, UN Institute for Disarmament Research (2013). 
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6. In addition to lack of multilateral leverage over disarmament, other critical 
factors create structural inequalities in global nuclear diplomacy: only five out 
of nine nuclear weapon states are signatories, limiting the NPT’s impact on 
global disarmament negotiations; Article VI, which concerns disarmament, is 
lacking in legal strength and its meaning is open to interpretation; and the 
indefinite 1995 extension of the NPT was premised on a package of 
initiatives, which included the convening of a Middle East WMD-Free Zone 
Conference and progress being made on the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) and Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty, yet, of these, only the CTBT has 
been implemented and six nuclear weapon states have not yet ratified it.
7. The perception of a two-tiered hierarchy within the NPT creates a sense of 
futility on the part of the non-nuclear weapon states over reaching any 
meaningful progress, particularly with regard to their key demand for 
disarmament. This leads to more confrontational and obstructive behaviours 
than would otherwise be the case in a more balanced negotiating framework. 
For instance, one of the tools available to all states is to block consensus on a 
final document at NPT Review Conferences. Without more progress on 
disarmament, this dynamic may ultimately undermine the NPT framework as 
a forum for constructive debate. 
8. The past NPT Review Conference in 2015 failed to produce a consensus 
agreement on a final declaration document. There is therefore added 
pressure to achieve a final declaration document at the 2020 conference in 
order to avoid a weakening of trust in the NPT process, which over the longer 
term could potentially result in some states seeking alternatives. Leading up 
to 2020, there are high expectations for achieving momentum, with the 75th 
anniversary of Hiroshima to be marked the same year. Reaching a consensus 
agreement will require strong leadership as well as compromise by state 
parties. 
9. The NPT Review Conference in 2025 is the key event that arouses most 
attention since, by then, the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons is expected to have entered into force. Yet, as most NPT signatories 
would agree, a legally-binding nuclear ban will not make the NPT architecture 
redundant, precisely for the reasons behind the 1995 decision to extend it 
indefinitely – namely to prevent new states acquiring nuclear weapons and 
stem other proliferation activities. Moreover, nuclear weapon states are 
highly unlikely to disarm unilaterally; even step-by-step disarmament has 
historically required a sea change in security conditions.
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Recalibrating the UK’s Role in International Nuclear Diplomacy 
Dr Sarah Tzinieris
1. It cannot be overstated that the UK government is legally committed to 
pursue negotiations in ‘good faith’ on nuclear disarmament12, and has been 
so since 1968 when it signed and ratified the NPT. Whilst official government 
statements recognise the UK’s responsibilities as a nuclear weapon state 
within the NPT framework, there appears to be greater ambiguity about the 
implications of these responsibilities within government discourses and even 
inside the civil service and military. 
2. The UK has a real opportunity to take a leadership role in the 2020 NPT 
Review Conference, especially by providing a bridge for communication 
between the P5 and other state signatories. The 2020 RevCon is regarding as 
a litmus test for progress since failure to produce a consensus final document 
would mark the first time that two consecutive RevCons ended without this 
agreement. Such a failure would lead to further loss of confidence in the NPT 
process. 
3. Ahead of 2020 RevCon, the UK can engage constructively by enhancing 
cooperation between disparate states involved in the NPT process, 
particularly between the nuclear weapon states and groupings of non-nuclear 
weapon states that have traditionally been influential such as the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). The UK’s bridging role also needs to 
focus on closing gaps in perceptions between proponents and detractors of 
the ban treaty. In particular, the UK might look to communicate the threat 
perceptions warranting possession of nuclear weapons to those states not 
party to a nuclear umbrella guarantee, since security conditions are often the 
sticking point in negotiations.
4. The UK is uniquely placed to act as a bridge or pivot between disparate 
groups in the NPT by virtue of its membership in the P5, whilst at the same 
time possessing a low number of nuclear warheads (in relative terms) and a 
single delivery platform. The UK has a long history of successfully utilising 
multilateral fora to contribute to international peace and development. 
Nevertheless, the UK will need to ensure that this approach is not perceived 
as a self-interested strategy to maximise strategic influence, or worse, as a 
smokescreen to mask lack of progress on disarmament.
5. If the UK is serious about pursuing a leadership role ahead of the 2020 
RevCon, the government must recognise that its credibility will hinge on 
being able to follow through with concerted efforts and actions. Ultimately, 
lack of progress within the NPT process was what motivated states to pursue 
a ban treaty. Non-nuclear weapon states are growing increasingly 
disillusioned by empty rhetoric on disarmament which has characterised 
decades of NPT meetings, and they can be expected to push for tangible 
outcomes. 
6. Building coalitions between disparate groups within the NPT would denote 
constructive diplomatic efforts by the UK, especially if this were to ease 
12 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (1 July 1968).
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tensions between ban treaty proponents and detractors. Nonetheless, playing 
an active role in global nuclear diplomacy is not equivalent to taking concrete 
steps on disarmament. Still, it is difficult to see how a further cut in the 
number of the UK’s missiles, warheads or delivery platforms would be 
sufficient to maintain a posture of minimum credible deterrence.
7. Short of the presently unthinkable – although not unachievable – 
abandonment of its continuous at-sea deterrent, the UK’s options for making 
progress on disarmament are limited to declaratory policy. One obvious way 
to do this is take more concerted efforts to engage with other nuclear 
weapon states, and this must necessarily include China and Russia – the 
latter even in the face of ongoing major political strains. Such engagement 
should also include the non-NPT state signatories: Israel, India, Pakistan and 
the DPRK – although the UK would need to work in concert with the US, 
China and Russia to facilitate the participation of the non-NPT states, which 
can be expected to be highly distrustful of any multilateral initiative. 
8. In the past decade, the P5 framework for negotiations over the NPT has not 
produced any meaningful progress with regard to disarmament. Whilst 
breaking the impasse between the US and Russia over the issues will remain 
critical, the UK might promote the P3 framework (US, France and UK) as a 
means to achieve tangible outcomes. 
9. Within the framework of engagement with nuclear weapon states, the UK 
might seek to publicise its technical work on verification and arms control in 
order to create alternative pathways. As highlighted by the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, building an effective verification regime can build the 
necessary trust required to make political progress over disarmament. 
10.The UK has taken a leading role in a variety of non-proliferation fora, 
including the Proliferation Security Initiative, International Partnership for 
Disarmament Verification, the UK-Norway Initiative and the Quad Verification 
Partnership. The UK has also made important long-standing contributions 
within the NPT to the non-proliferation pillar (through its technical work on 
export controls) and the peaceful use of nuclear energy pillar (through its 
capacity support for nuclear safety, nuclear security and reactor design for 
new civil nuclear programmes). Much of this work takes place behind the 
scenes, so publicising it more effectively would build recognition of the UK’s 
long-term commitment to global nuclear diplomacy. Such public relations 
efforts are worth instigating not just in the traditional NPT framework, but in 
the Global Britain agenda and various multilateral fora. 
11.A more ambitious approach could be for the UK – possibly in tandem with 
France – to encourage other nuclear weapon states to adopt a minimum level 
of nuclear deterrence. Whilst this is unlikely to wield positive results in the 
short term, the UK could seek to develop a longer-term framework to return 
to this issue on a periodic basis. 
12.Whilst achieving progress at 2020 is critical, progress over global nuclear 
diplomacy is about playing the long game and the UK will need to commit 
resources and attention beyond 2020. Disarmament in particular requires 
long lead-in times to enact change. Meanwhile, the 2025 RevCon will bring 
new pressures to bear on the NPT review process due to the likelihood that 
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the TPNW will be ratified by that date. The UK’s commitment to playing a 
constructive role in disarmament efforts will require cross-party support to 
ensure that future British governments take up the baton. 
13.In addition to ensuring a long-term commitment to global nuclear diplomacy, 
achieving cross-party support over non-proliferation and disarmament is in 
the public interest. There remain crucial differences between the two main 
British political parties over the UK’s nuclear deterrent which creates 
ambiguities for long-term planning. The Brexit project has served to side line 
these debates over the past three years, but they will almost certainly re-
emerge, particularly as key decisions are made over the transition to the 
Dreadnought series and associated decommissioning.
14.As a liberal democracy, maintaining public support for the UK’s global nuclear 
diplomacy will be vital to make this project successful and, most importantly, 
sustainable. At present, public understanding of the UK’s nuclear posture and 
the realities of the nuclear deterrent is limited. A simple action to increase 
public engagement would be to update the UK government website. The 
website is currently limited to information on the nuclear deterrent and does 
not include the UK’s broader work on non-proliferation and verification, nor 
its long-standing commitment to the NPT process. 
15.For the time being, the UK’s political pressures amid Brexit uncertainty will 
make progress on global nuclear diplomacy a trying endeavour. There are 
also budgetary pressures across the civil service. Nonetheless, the 2020 
RevCon presents a vital opportunity for the UK to contribute to progress and 
the risk of further impasse will make the world more dangerous.
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UK Leadership for Constructive Dialogue on Nuclear Disarmament 
Responsibilities
Dr Lyndon Burford
Core recommendation
1. As nuclear weapons-related threats become more complex, numerous and 
interdependent, the need for concerted, multilateral action to address 
them is becoming more urgent. Meanwhile, the international community 
finds itself without a forum capable of sustaining constructive dialogue on 
how disarmament might help to address those threats. The United 
Kingdom (UK) should therefore support the recent US proposal to 
establish disarmament working groups under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and building on Britain’s record of constructive 
disarmament leadership, should offer to co-chair a multilateral NPT 
working group on the theme “Responsibilities under Article VI.”13 To 
maximise the strategic and political benefit of this initiative, the UK should 
invite a non-nuclear weapon state from the global South to co-chair the 
group, and welcome administrative and substantive contributions from 
international civil society.
 
2. This initiative would help to secure three core British interests. First, it 
would demonstrate Britain’s good faith commitment under NPT Article VI 
to advance nuclear disarmament, thus helping strengthen the multilateral 
nuclear order based on the NPT, from which the UK derives significant 
strategic benefit; second, it would facilitate essential dialogue on how 
disarmament can assist in reducing nuclear threats such as the growing 
risk of nuclear war caused by a range of disruptive political and 
technological developments; and third, it would advance the Global Britain 
initiative at home and abroad via UK leadership on a vital international 
security issue.
Working group format and theme
3. NPT Article VI commits all States Parties to the Treaty “to pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,” as 
well as to pursue general and complete disarmament. But many non-
nuclear weapon states see the current NPT review process as failing to 
facilitate the fulfilment of these responsibilities or produce tangible 
progress in multilateral disarmament, while unhelpfully limiting the scope 
of expert support for the task by restricting the participation of 
international civil society. 
4. As nuclear weapons-related threats become more numerous and complex 
(issues discussed in more detail below), both allied and independent/non-
aligned non-nuclear weapon states are demanding greater attention be 
paid to identifying and addressing the evolving sources of nuclear risk. 
The format of the working group can be used to address these concerns 
and to maximise its positive political impact on NPT dynamics. In this 
regard, the UK should seek to co-chair the working group with a non-
nuclear weapon state from the global South. It should welcome the 
13 See Amb. Christopher Ford’s remarks at Wilton Park, 10 December 2018: “The P5 Process and Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament: A New 
Structured Dialogue.” https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/2018/288018.htm 
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participation of all interested NPT Parties and civil society experts, and 
pursue grant funding to support the engagement of officials and 
nongovernmental experts from the global South. Finally, it should appoint 
a highly-qualified civil society partner to help coordinate funding support 
and civil society participation.
5. This format would ensure the consideration of a diversity of views on how 
disarmament action might help to reduce the risk of accidental, 
unauthorised, miscalculated or intentional nuclear war. In doing so, it 
would demonstrate Britain’s commitment to pursuing and supporting good 
faith efforts to advance nuclear disarmament under NPT Article VI, which 
would help to ameliorate the antagonistic political dynamics surrounding 
the issue in the lead up to the 2020 NPT Review Conference. In the longer 
term, this would strengthen the NPT review process and help safeguard 
international commitment to the Treaty as a cornerstone of the 
disarmament and nonproliferation regime. Britain could further 
demonstrate leadership in this context by inviting the other NPT nuclear 
weapon states to co-chair parallel working groups in the same format.
6. In terms of thematic focus, a British-led working group should seek to 
emphasise the vital, common interest of the international community in 
preventing nuclear war, while exploring the evolving disarmament 
responsibilities of NPT members given the rapidly changing security 
environment—particularly with regard to the impact on deterrence 
practices of disruptive technologies. In political terms, it would be useful 
to frame this initiative as an NPT-based “nuclear disarmament working 
group,” setting aside the US label “Creating the Conditions for Nuclear 
Disarmament.” The latter is deeply unpopular even among allied 
countries, in part due to its perceived emphasis on barriers to, rather than 
means to advance, disarmament, and in part to its association with the 
nuclear weapon states’ common insistence that no disarmament action is 
possible at present.
7. To address widespread concerns about evolving and expanding nuclear 
risks, and to facilitate constructive dialogue about how disarmament 
action can help to address those risks, topics for discussion in the working 
group should include:
a. Pathways to nuclear war. To prevent nuclear war in a rapidly 
evolving security environment, it is necessary first to establish 
agreement on potential pathways to war, then on collective action 
that might be taken to preclude them. As multiple political and 
technological factors disrupt the status quo, constructive dialogue 
on these issues is urgently needed.
b. Technological disruption of nuclear deterrence. Technologies 
such as cyber capabilities, AI, machine learning, remote sensing, 
computing networking, robotics and autonomous vehicles threaten 
to undermine confidence in nuclear command and control and early 
warning systems. If this threat is realised, it will increase the 
perceived ‘use it or lose it’ incentive for nuclear first strikes in a 
crisis.14  Nuclear weapon states and their allies in particular have a 
responsibility under NPT Article VI to acknowledge such threats and 
14 Stanislav Abaimov and Paul Ingram, “Hacking UK Trident: A Growing Threat” (London: BASIC, 2017). 
http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/HACKING_UK_TRIDENT.pdf. 
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show how they are responding to reduce the risk of deterrence 
failure.
c. The disarmament-deterrence conundrum. Deterrence 
advocates often worry that disarmament action will reduce 
deterrence credibility, increasing adversaries’ motivation for 
aggression and thus, also increasing the risk of conflict that may 
escalate to nuclear war. This conundrum must be addressed if 
disarmament is to progress.
d. International law and nuclear weapons. Global awareness of 
the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is increasing 
while the risk of nuclear use is arguably becoming more acute. In 
this context, examining how international law can constrain nuclear 
policy and practice may help to advance disarmament and lower 
the risk of war.
e. Disarmament and nonproliferation education. Despite 
widespread agreement on the value of education, little concerted 
action has been taken in the NTP context to harvest this ‘low-
hanging fruit.’ British leadership could produce useful results in the 
short term in this area, by facilitating multilateral cooperation on 
nuclear education in public and political constituencies.
f. Gender balance and perspectives in nuclear forums. As is the 
case with education, widespread agreement on the value of gender 
diversity and gender perspectives in disarmament forums has yet 
to produce collective commitments or action. Existing initiatives 
such as Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy are further low-
hanging fruit, offering tangible, immediate options to demonstrate 
good faith disarmament efforts and build new modes of 
cooperation.15
Rationale: reduce the risk of nuclear war, defend the multilateral order 
8. The UK derives significant strategic benefit from the multilateral nuclear 
order built on the NPT, which has helped to slow the spread of nuclear 
weapons and reduce the risk of nuclear war. It is therefore strongly in the 
British national interest to take decisive action to address the political, 
social and technological disruptions which, collectively, are threatening the 
foundations of the nuclear order and increasing the risk of nuclear war.
9. In 2017, for example, former US Secretary of Defense William Perry 
warned that there was “greater danger of a nuclear catastrophe than we 
faced during the Cold War” and worse, that unlike during the Cold War, 
“hardly anybody understands that.”16 Examples of dynamics that are 
increasing the complexity and scale of nuclear weapons-related risk 
include:
a. a return to great power competition combined with the demise of 
bilateral arms control
b. plans to produce high-accuracy, low-yield nuclear weapons that lower 
the perceived threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, thus 
increasing the risk of intentional nuclear war
15 See https://www.gcnuclearpolicy.org/. 
16 William J. Perry, “The Risk of Nuclear Catastrophe Is Greater Today Than During the Cold War,” Huffington Post, 6 December 2017. 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-jperry/nuclear-catastrophe-risk_b_9019558.html 
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c. renewed nuclear arms-races in complex, multipolar contexts where 
Cold War-era threat reduction technologies, agreements and shared 
understandings are often absent
d. a growing ‘entanglement’ of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems, 
which increases the number and complexity of potential pathways to 
escalation from conventional to nuclear war
e. the splintering of international opinion on how to advance nuclear 
disarmament, with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW) demonstrating a profound frustration among the majority of 
non-nuclear weapon states at the lack of progress on multilateral 
nuclear disarmament
f. lowered barriers to nuclear weapons acquisition by new states and 
non-state actors due to the rapid advance of disruptive technologies 
such as 3D printing, laser-based uranium enrichment and 
nanotechnologies
10.Without concerted preventive action, the likely result of these dynamics 
over time is an increased risk of accidental, unauthorised, miscalculated 
or intentional nuclear war. International debates about evolving nuclear 
threats suggest that British strategic and political interests would be 
served by acknowledging the emerging sources of nuclear risk and 
exploring further steps to mitigate them, including through disarmament 
action where appropriate. While helping to lower the risk of nuclear war, 
addressing these issues in a British-led, multilateral disarmament working 
group would also be welcomed as evidence that the UK continues to take 
its NPT responsibilities seriously.
11.Establishment of a new venue for sustained dialogue of this type would be 
valuable because, unlike the range of forums that currently exists to 
support international efforts for nuclear nonproliferation, safety and 
security, there is at present no international forum capable of facilitating 
constructive, multilateral dialogue on nuclear disarmament. The 
Conference on Disarmament is hobbled by the arbitrary application of its 
consensus rule to even administrative matters, such that the Conference 
has failed to agree on an agenda, let alone negotiate for disarmament, 
since 1996. The Disarmament Commission attached to the UN General 
Assembly—an advisory body only—has nevertheless also struggled, 
“unable to agree on any substantial outcome” from 2000 to 2017, when it 
endorsed recommendations for a set of confidence building measures 
related to conventional weapons.17
12.The NPT review process was strengthened as one of the conditions for its 
indefinite extension in 1995, with States Parties agreeing to hold a 
Preparatory Committee meeting in each of the three years leading up to 
the five-yearly Review Conference, and a fourth, if necessary, in the same 
year as the Review Conference. Regardless, the process rarely produces 
meaningful disarmament dialogue, with delegates often reading pre-
prepared statements that talk past each other’s concerns, further 
embedding a sense of division rather than shared interest. In 2005, for 
example, the conference was unable to agree on a programme of work for 
almost three weeks, leaving only 5 days to substantive discussions and 
debates, and ending in failure. The 2015 conference likewise failed to 
17 UNODA, “United Nations Disarmament Commission.” https://www.un.org/disarmament/institutions/disarmament-commission/ 
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reach consensus, and debates at the 2017 and 2018 Preparatory 
Committee meetings were more fractious and antagonistic than in 2015.
13.Faced with nuclear-weapons-related threats that are increasing in 
number, complexity and interdependence, and sharp international 
disagreements over the best means of advancing disarmament, the UK 
can help to advance global cooperation by engaging decisively at an early 
stage in the establishment of NPT disarmament working groups. This 
would allow the UK to help shape the format, composition and focus of the 
groups, use them to highlight common-ground issues around which new 
modes of cooperation can be built, and ensure that the initiative 
strengthens the NPT review process in the long-term.
British leadership and the shared global interest in preventing nuclear 
war
14.In the first paragraph of the NPT preamble, States Parties affirm “the 
devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and 
the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a 
war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples.” This core 
objective unites proponents of the so-called ‘security-based’ and 
‘humanitarian’ approaches to nuclear disarmament—the former being that 
favoured by the nuclear weapon states and their allies, and the latter, the 
approach favoured by the majority of non-nuclear weapon states, which 
became a motivating factor for negotiation of the TPNW. 
15.Adoption of the TPNW in 2017 revealed sharp disagreements among NPT 
members on the strategic and moral value of nuclear weapons and the 
best means of achieving disarmament. But in the context of a growing set 
of risks that may lead to nuclear war, the shared global interest—indeed, 
humanity’s existential interest—in preventing such war constitutes an area 
of common ground that, with strong international leadership, might help 
to re-establish cooperation between proponents of the security-based and 
humanitarian approaches to disarmament on the path to the 2020 NPT 
Review Conference. 
16.The UK is well placed to play such a leadership role. It has a strong record 
of disarmament leadership, including as a result of the UK-Norway 
Initiative—a pioneering effort to engage non-nuclear weapon states in the 
process of verifying nuclear warhead dismantlement without revealing 
proliferation-sensitive information.18 These technical efforts are essential 
and should continue. They help to demonstrate the feasibility of 
disarmament and to build trust between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear 
armed NPT members. A new technical area that deserves exploration in 
this regard is the potential for blockchain or ‘distributed leger 
technology’—the foundation upon which crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin 
are built—to support future disarmament verification efforts.
17.But while such technical efforts are valuable, the current impasse in 
disarmament discussions revolves around much broader, security-political 
issues and it is these hard issues that NPT members must address if 
disarmament is to advance in a security-enhancing manner. By 
18 See https://ukni.info/. 
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establishing a multilateral NPT disarmament working group under the 
theme “Responsibilities under Article VI”, the UK could demonstrate its 
commitment to supporting and advancing good faith disarmament efforts, 
help to lead international efforts to mitigate evolving nuclear-weapons 
related threats and the risk of nuclear war, and help to sustain political 
support for the NPT beyond 2020, irrespective of the Review Conference 
outcome. 
18.Recent evidence suggests that experts and officials from European allies 
value British disarmament leadership and would welcome further UK 
initiatives in this field.19 Leadership on this vital international security 
issue also resonates strongly with the theme of Global Britain, and would 
help to advance that enterprise in both domestic and international 
institutions.
19 Cristina Varriale, “European Views on Leadership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Recommendations for the UK,” (London: RUSI, 
November 2018).
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The Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament
Dr Sarah Tzinieris
1. In the same way that provisions of international law have been effective in 
banning chemical and biological weapons, disarmament advocates believe a 
new legal framework is necessary to force change on nuclear weapons. At its 
heart, the TPNW is a comprehensive and categorical prohibition on all forms 
of activity involving nuclear weapons.20 By association, nuclear weapons are 
put in the same legal category as other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
The TPNW is incompatible with theories of nuclear deterrence and does not 
have any provisions recognising the security concerns of nuclear weapon 
states. Security is defined only in terms of how it relates to humanity and 
collective survival.
2. The Humanitarian Initiative, the precursor to the TPNW, was a turning point 
for global nuclear diplomacy as it presented overwhelming fact-based 
evidence that even a ‘limited’ nuclear exchange would have worldwide effects 
on human development, with millions of deaths and injuries and the practical 
impossibility of immediate rescue missions. Evidence was also employed to 
show the long-standing impacts on the environment, climate and food 
security.21 This was a new way of framing the debates, which had historically 
been dominated by ‘techno-strategic’ discourses focused on deterrence 
theories.22 Notwithstanding the longer-term implications of the TPNW, 
debates within the international community are privileging more and more 
the humanitarian, human security and international development implications 
of nuclear weapons. 
3. Despite the impact of the Humanitarian Initiative on international debates, 
the nuclear weapon states – including the UK – have been reluctant to 
engage with humanitarian issues in official policy statements regarding 
nuclear weapons. The responses of the P5 to the TPNW when it was 
negotiated in 2017 reflected a traditional security approach and overweening 
reliance on deterrence theories.23 
4. The TPNW was not designed to engender the immediate disarmament of 
nuclear weapon states – and this is the view taken by the majority of its 
state parties. Rather, the treaty’s provisions are aimed at applying 
international humanitarian law against indiscriminate and disproportionate 
attacks on human populations and the natural environment. In the same way 
that the 1999 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and 2008 Convention on 
20 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (7 July 2017). 
21 See for example, Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press (2004); Richard P. Turco, Owen Brian Toon, Thomas P. Ackerman, James B. Pollack and Carl Sagan, ‘Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of 
Multiple Nuclear Explosions’, Science, Vol. 222, No. 4630 (23 December 1983), pp. 1,283–92; Lou Maresca, ‘The Catastrophic Humanitarian 
Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: the Key Issues and Perspective of the International Committee of the Red Cross’, in Borrie and Caughley (eds.) 
Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a Humanitarian Lens (2013), pp. 134–35.
22 Carol Cohn, ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’, Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4, Within and Without: Women, Gender, and 
Theory (Summer 1987), pp. 687-718.
23 See the following statements: Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference, 20 March 2017; Joint Press 
Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017; North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 20 
September 2017; and Russian Mission’s comments on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 27 September 2017.
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Cluster Munitions both emerged after traditional forums failed, the TPNW is 
explicitly intended to reframe the normative context for nuclear weapons. 
The objective is to delegitimise nuclear weapons in such a way that the 
incentive structures will change for nuclear weapon states and others that 
rely on extended nuclear deterrence. As such, the TPNW is not expected to 
bring about outright disarmament or proliferation prevention – and any 
discernible impacts on these will be diffuse, not easily measurable, and in 
concert with other initiatives.
5. One of the main shortcomings of multilateral nuclear weapon treaties is the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms. For precisely this reason, states are 
increasingly focusing on the development of norms in international affairs – 
the rationale behind the new ban treaty. As such, the TPNW should be not be 
judged in terms of its mechanisms for coercion, but rather its ability to 
induce nuclear weapon states to undertake disarmament – and, at the same 
time, that it does not undermine other arms treaties. 
6. The TPNW has created a new sense of urgency about nuclear weapons, 
particularly as this relates to humanitarian issues. It has also served as a 
catalyst for creating new momentum and commitment to pursue new 
disarmament approaches. One area where there has recently been some 
progress on disarmament is the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In March 
2018, the 65-member forum took the decision to form subsidiary bodies on 
five agenda items related to nuclear weapons. Whilst it is impossible to 
calculate how much impact the TPNW had on inducing change, the 
development indicates that the ban treaty has not served to polarise states to 
the extent had been predicted. Meanwhile, there has been a small divestment 
in nuclear weapons manufacturers. According to the ‘Don’t Bank on the 
Bomb’ report, produced by Dutch non-profit organisation PAX, at least 30 
institutional investors have divested or refused to invest in such companies 
since the TPNW was signed, including the investors, GE Capital, Deutsche 
Bank and Vulcan Value Partners.24 Yet, again, it is difficult to calculate the 
TPNW’s impact on inducing this change. 
7. The arrival of the TPNW has aggravated concerns about further polarisation 
within the international community over the dual challenges of nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation, two of the three main pillars of the NPT. 
Nuclear weapon states, including the UK, argue that the TPNW is not only 
ineffective but risks undermining the NPT at a time when a unified approach 
to proliferation is critical. Proponents of the TPNW counter that there have 
always existed differing views within the international community on nuclear 
disarmament; what has changed is the formalisation of this collective 
dissatisfaction through a legal instrument. Indeed, TPNW proponents do not 
necessarily view polarisation as a negative issue, since it is more likely to 
mean pressure is brought to bear on nuclear weapon states. Historically, 
progress has been made on arm treaties where stakes have been high. 
8. According to ban detractors, the TPNW ignores the reality of the 
contemporary international security environment in which deterrence is 
necessary; any move towards disarmament require a step-by-step approach. 
There are also concerns that the TPNW could divert resources and focus away 
from the NPT and other established frameworks which facilitate negotiations 
24 Susi Snyder, ‘2018 Don’t Bank on the Bomb’, Pax for Peace (2 March 2018). 
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over disarmament. At various times, the P5 states have used language 
asserting that the TPNW would ‘undermine’, ‘weaken’ and ‘damage’ the NPT25 
(although arguably China has remained more circumspect in its public 
statements.26  
9. Some ban detractors have highlighted that the TPNW is only likely to have 
resonance in liberal democracies where democratically elected governments 
are more responsive to public opinion, protests and normative arguments. It 
is argued that the US, France and the UK are at a disadvantage versus states 
such as Russia and China. 
10.The arrival of a new legal instrument presents a potential challenge to the 
NPT review cycles, not least because many perceive the TPNW as a tactic 
born out of frustration with lack of progress on disarmament within the NPT 
framework. Despite the possible contradictions, however, to date 
international debates over nuclear weapons have been less fraught than 
predicted. The evidence from the previous two NPT Preparatory Committees 
suggests that fears the TPNW would distract or undermine the NPT process 
appear to have been overplayed. Indeed, both the meetings in 2017 and 
2018 attracted a higher level of participation by government representatives 
than the preceding review cycle.27 Whilst the TPNW featured in a number of 
government pre-prepared statements and rights of reply in both Prepcoms, it 
is difficult to argue that the new ban treaty dominated debate or even 
disrupted the proceedings. 
11.There are concerns with the legal implications of the TPNW, especially in 
terms of its alignment with the NPT. The TPNW’s comprehensive set of 
prohibitions on partaking in any nuclear weapon activities – including 
undertakings not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use 
or threaten to use nuclear weapons – could potentially make the NPT 
subordinate to the TPNW, on account of the NPT’s narrower objectives. TPNW 
proponents argue this claim is flawed as the TPNW’s preamble specifically 
recognises the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation regime. Yet, it cannot be denied that the TPNW seeks to go 
further in its prohibitions than the NPT meaning there is potential for 
interpretative conflicts, for instance over peaceful nuclear cooperation (the 
NPT’s third pillar) with a nuclear weapon state. 
12.Criticism of the TPNW has often focused on the issue of disarmament 
verification. The TPNW provides only an outline with the details to be dealt 
with by an unspecified ‘competent national authority’. Such lack of detail 
reflects an implicit recognition by state parties during negotiations that 
disarmament was unlikely to take place immediately, not least because the 
non-nuclear weapon states were unlikely to join the TPNW. Indeed, this 
bolsters the argument that the TPNW was not intended, at least in the short 
term, as a treaty to be implemented in any practicable sense – but rather to 
25 See the following statements on the TPNW: United Kingdom’s Statement at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Main Committee 1 (15 May 2015); 
France’s Statement at the 71st UNGA First Committee (4 October 2016); United States’ Statement at the 71st UNGA First Committee (14 October 
2016); North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (20 September 2017). 
26 See Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference (20 March 2017). 
27 For instance, a comparison can be made at equivalent points of the 2010-2015 and 2015-2020 review cycles. At the first PrepCom, there were 
632 registered diplomats from 109 states in 2012; these numbers increased to 742 diplomats from 114 states in 2017. At the second PrepCom, 
there were 580 diplomats from 106 states in 2013; these numbers increased to 612 diplomats from 112 states in 2018. Figures available in Gro 
Nystuen, Kjølv Egeland and Torbjørn Graff Hugo ‘The TPNW: Setting the Record Straight’, Norwegian Academy of International Law (October 2018). 
23
provide a nominal legal framework and, in so doing, create the normative 
conditions for nuclear disarmament. 
13.Criticism of the TPNW has also focused on safeguards. The TPNW obligates 
every state party to either maintain or, if not already in place, to bring into 
force the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153 Corrected). 
By providing the caveat that this agreement is without prejudice to additional 
safeguard instruments, it ensures that states can upgrade their safeguard 
standards by adopting an Additional Protocol as well as accommodate any 
higher standards that might be available. Furthermore, the TPNW prohibits 
acceded states to withdraw from existing arrangements. This is why 
proponents argue the TPNW goes further than the NPT, which only obligates 
state parties to ‘accept safeguards’ in an unspecified agreement with the 
IAEA and does not enforce the Additional Protocol. 
14.Whilst state and civil society proponents of the TPNW remain resolute that 
the treaty will achieve its normative objectives, there has not been a 
discernible uptake in accession figures. As of January 2019, only 19 state 
parties have gone on to ratify the TPWN out of the 122 states that voted in 
favour in July 2017.28 Nonetheless, the pace of ratification has preceded 
faster than some comparable treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.
15.The relatively slow pace of ratification appears partly contributable to issues 
being raised about the treaty text itself. At the time, there was considerable 
time pressure to enact the TPWN to capitalise on the current political 
momentum, even potentially at the expense of clarity and legal 
misinterpretation. Underscoring the accelerated timescale, the treaty text 
was finalised after only four weeks of formal negotiations between the state 
parties. Partly for this reason, various governments are now conducting legal 
assessments of the risks and costs of the treaty, which could potentially lead 
to some states never ratifying the treaty. Indeed, the Swiss government 
opened an inquiry and announced in August 2018 it would not sign the TPNW 
at the current time (although the Swiss parliament is seeking to overrule this 
decision). Nevertheless, other treaty proponents argue that the text is 
deliberately encompassing to provide for a strong condemnation of all forms 
of nuclear weapon activities. 
16.Whilst few would argue that the TPNW is set to enter into customary 
international law in the immediate term, the differences in interpretation of 
the treaty, as well as a lack of clarity in some aspects of the text, make it 
difficult for TPNW proponents to argue that both general state practice and 
opinio juris are sufficiently aligned with treaty principles. As such, the TPNW 
cannot be expected to be legally binding on those states that do not accept 
the provisions of the treaty. TPNW proponents would argue that this issue is 
immaterial, at least in the short term, since the treaty is primarily designed 
to generate normative pressure rather than establish customary law. 
17.No concrete evidence has yet arisen that the TPNW is undermining the NPT, 
or the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes more broadly. Rather, the 
TPNW is more likely to have an impact on its primary goals of strengthening 
norms on the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons and applying pressure on 
28 For the latest on the TPNW’s ratification, see the UN Treaties Collection site
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nuclear weapon states to disarm. However, any tangible impacts are unlikely 
to be realised years from now and more than likely within a less febrile 
international security environment.
18.Another area where the TPNW is seeking to apply normative pressure is the 
development of new WMD-free zones, most pertinently a WMD-free zone in 
the Middle East which has been put on hold for years. Awareness of the 
TPNW is likely to grow in the coming years – as well as of the humanitarian 
issues that the treaty highlights – which may potentially lead to regions 
deciding that a WMD-free zone is the most effective way to enhance their 
security. 
19.In the future, the TPNW may apply normative pressure on non-nuclear 
weapon states that host nuclear weapons on their territory or are in other 
extended deterrence arrangements. In contrast to the TPNW, the NPT does 
not contain prohibitions on non-nuclear weapon states hosting nuclear 
weapons –ultimately blurring the lines of the grand bargain. Notably, 
Australia has a long-standing security alliance with the US yet the opposition 
Labor party has committed to signing and ratifying the TPNW in government.29 
Other states in security alliances with nuclear weapon states – including 
Kazakhstan, the Philippines and Thailand – have already signed the TPNW. 
Still, the only one of these states to have ratified the TPNW – Thailand – has 
a somewhat disengaged relationship with its security guarantor.30 
20.The impact of the potential development of new WMD-free zones and even 
abandonment of extended nuclear deterrence will be to further delegitimise 
nuclear proliferation. In this sense, the TPNW could potentially go beyond its 
central goal of disarmament to progress international efforts on non-
proliferation, which in turn serves to reinforce the first pillar of the NPT. 
21.Value-laden comparisons between the NPT and TPNW are not helpful when 
evaluating the impact of these treaties on disarmament (and non-
proliferation). When progress is achieved over an issue that relates to 
multiple touch points in international diplomacy, it is almost impossible to 
distinguish whether one particular treaty was instrumental in inducing the 
change. Whilst it is true to say that not one nuclear warhead has been 
dismantled as a result of direct negotiations within the NPT – and neither, the 
TPNW – the existence of both these treaties strengthens the international 
security architecture, with an international legal framework serving to 
buttress bilateral negotiations. 
29 The Guardian, ‘Labor set for nuclear showdown as Gareth Evans warns of risk to US alliance’ (17 December 2018). 
30 See for instance, Brian Harding, ‘Moving the U.S-Thailand Alliance Forward’, Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (7 August 2018). 
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Assessing Global and UK Efforts to Counter the Threat of Nuclear 
Terrorism
Dr Christopher Hobbs 
Introduction
1. This section explores non-state actor threats to nuclear weapons, civil 
nuclear materials and facilities, examining the international regime that 
governs these materials and national-level responses. UK government and 
industry have played an active role in mitigating this risk through 
strengthening nuclear security systems domestically and globally. The UK 
is working bi- and multi-laterally with other states and supporting the 
work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this area.
2. In political discourses, the importance of nuclear security is typically 
framed in terms of countering the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is this 
key risk that is explored in detail in this section, however, it should be 
emphasised that terrorist groups do not represent the only threat in this 
area. Organised crime and individuals can and have been motivated by 
financial gain, disgruntlement and other reasons to steal and illicitly traffic 
nuclear materials and sabotage facilities. Here, ‘insiders’ – employees or 
others that misuses their legitimate access (physical or electronic) to 
commit a malicious act – represent arguably the greatest threat.31
3. There are a very broad range of policy measures that can be enacted 
against the terrorist threat, from counter-radicalisation to intelligence and 
policing. Given the nuclear focus of the inquiry, discussion here is limited 
to activities that reduce the vulnerability of nuclear materials, facilities 
and sensitive information, which would fall under the Protect Strand of the 
UK’s Counter Terrorism Strategy, and within the UK’s National Security 
Strategy and Counter-Proliferation Strategy.32
Nuclear Terrorism – Concept, Threat Perceptions and Assessing Risk
4. Nuclear terrorism is an issue which defies simple formulation, with 
international treaties, political and public discourse capturing a spectrum 
of adversary activities.33 Conceptually, nuclear terrorism can be thought of 
as encompassing four broad scenarios, which vary widely in terms of 
barriers to success and potential impact:34
a. Acquisition of a nuclear weapon from a state arsenal and its 
detonation;
b. Theft or purchase of nuclear material, construction and detonation 
of an ‘Improvised Nuclear Device’;
c. Sabotage of a nuclear facility or transport, releasing radioactivity;
31 Christopher Hobbs and Matthew Moran, ‘Insider Threats: An Educational Handbook of Nuclear & Non-Nuclear Case Studies’, King’s College 
London, 14th August 2015. https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/csss/pubs/insider-threats-an-educational-
handbook-of-nuclear-non-nuclear-case-studies-2017.pdf 
32 ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’, Gov.UK, p. 27 (June 2018); National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review 2015, Gov.UK, p. 26 (23 November 2015) National Counter-Proliferation Strategy to 2020, Gov.UK, p. 3 (24 March 
2016).
33 For example, see Article 2 of the ‘International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism’, UN, 2005 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/english-18-15.pdf 
34 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey 
Institute of International Studies, 2004), p. 3.
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d. Theft or purchase of non-nuclear radioactive materials and use in a 
radiological weapon. 
5. Nuclear terrorism has been near the forefront of UK and Western security 
debates for more than a decade and was described in 2009 by President 
Obama as the “most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”35 
However, this viewpoint is not shared by all states, particularly those that 
lack nuclear weapons, a civil nuclear sector or direct experience with 
terrorism. Diverging international threat perceptions in this area have 
served to complicate the global response, with states disagreeing on the 
extent to which nuclear security should be prioritised.
6. In any formal sense, assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism is an 
extremely challenging task due to the diversity of scenarios, multitude of 
pathways to success and the limited historical record that can be drawn 
upon when making predictions. Consequently, the use of risk assessment 
frameworks should be focused on discrete components of nuclear 
terrorism and carefully caveated.36 Nevertheless, the salience of nuclear 
terrorism has motivated the development of a number of unifying models, 
which attempt to quantify the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack. 
These have resulted in predictions that range from a near certainty to a 
virtual impossibility. Despite this extreme variance these estimates serve 
to influence political and public debates.
Nuclear Security – Scope and Primacy of the Nation State
7. The widely accepted IAEA definition of nuclear security is ‘the prevention 
and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, 
illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other 
radioactive substances or their associated facilities’.37 This encompasses a 
broad spectrum of activities from the physical protection of nuclear 
materials, sensitive information and facilities to the detection, recovery 
and identification of lost or stolen materials to emergency planning and 
post-incident response.
8. Nuclear security is a distinct concept to ‘nuclear safeguards’ which refers 
to technical measures applied by the IAEA to verify that states’ nuclear 
materials and technology are used only for peaceful purposes.
9. Individual states are responsible for establishing, implementing and 
assessing their national nuclear security regimes. In contrast to IAEA 
safeguards, there is no international system that provides oversight or 
verification that effective nuclear security measures are being employed. 
Instead IAEA developed guidance has served to generated a common 
baseline for implementing nuclear security, with IAEA peer review and 
support missions available to states upon request. 
35 ‘Obama promotes nuclear-free world’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7983963.stm (5 April 2009)
36 Robert J. Downes and Christopher Hobbs, ‘Nuclear Terrorism and Virtual Risk: Implication for Prediction and the Utility of Models’, European 
Journal of International Security, Vol. 2, Issue 2, p. 203-222 (July 2017)
37 Nuclear Security Series Glossary Version 1.3, Division of Nuclear Security, IAEA  https://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/nuclear-security-
series-glossary-v1-3.pdf (November 2015)
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International Nuclear Security Regime – Evolution, Complexity and 
Solidification
10.The international regime for nuclear security has evolved gradually over 
the past 40 years in response to the globalisation of the nuclear industry, 
increasing threat perceptions and perceived policy gaps.38 It is currently a 
patchwork of legally binding conventions, informal initiatives and 
international guidance. These elements cover different aspects of nuclear 
security and have varying memberships.39
11.The UK has in the past argued for greater international nuclear security 
oversight and enforcement, advocating in 2009 that it be promoted to a 
‘fourth pillar of the international framework’, alongside non-proliferation, 
disarmament and peaceful use.40 However, the introduction of a new 
unifying and verifiable nuclear security instrument, akin to the NPT, is 
complicated by its complexity, differences in international threat 
perceptions, and broader nuclear politics. Here, in lieu of greater progress 
towards nuclear disarmament, developing states are likely to remain 
reluctant to take on additional formal obligations in this area.
12.Given that a dramatic reform of the international nuclear security regime 
is currently unfeasible, efforts have focused on galvanising existing 
approaches through increasing high-level political buy-in. Here the most 
notable initiative in recent years was the US-led Nuclear Security Summit 
(NSS) process. From 2010 to 2016, world leaders and their 
representatives participated in four summits, resulting in hundreds of new 
national commitments and a number of high-profile tangible nuclear 
security improvements. The UK played an active role in this process, 
participating in each summit and launching new initiatives on cyber and 
maritime security.41
13.The impact of the NSS and other efforts to raise international awareness 
of nuclear security is clearly evidenced by the entry into force in 2016 of 
the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (CPPNM), following its ratification by two-thirds of state parties. 
As the only legally binding instrument with specific provisions for physical 
protection of civil nuclear material, this is a cornerstone of the 
international regime. The Amendment extends its mandate from 
international transport to domestic use and storage, demonstrating a 
solidification of nuclear security norms.
14.Despite a lack of formal authority, the IAEA plays a crucial role in 
supporting states to develop provisions on nuclear security – providing 
international guidance, training and support services upon request – 
including physical protection upgrades, the removal of high-risk materials 
and the strengthening of security culture. The IAEA also has an important 
communication and coordination role within different initiatives. For 
38 Wyn Q. Bowen, Matthew Cottee and Christopher Hobbs, International Affairs, 88: 2 (2012) p. 349–368. 
39 ‘Nuclear Security Briefing Book: 2016 Edition’, King’s College London, 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/csss/pubs/nuclear-security-briefing-book-2016-edition/2016nsbb---final-
version.pdf  (2016)
40 ‘The Road to 2010’, UK Cabinet Office, Gov.UK, p. 7 (July 2009).
41 Nuclear Security Summit 2016, FCO Policy Paper, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-security-summit-2016/nuclear-security-
summit-2016 (1st April 2016)
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example, the IAEA is responsible for organising the first review conference 
for CPPNM in 2021 and will host an International Conference on Nuclear 
Security in February 2020, including ministerial and technical sessions. 
15.The UK is one of the major contributors to the IAEA's nuclear security 
activities, both through the provision of expertise and a direct financial 
contribution, providing over forty millions pounds to the IAEA's Nuclear 
Security Fund since 2010. Given the centrality of the IAEA in this area, 
there is a strong argument for other states to increase this support, as 
long as new resources can be effectively utilised by the Agency.
Nuclear Security Implementation – International Cooperation and 
Domestic Transparency
16.The UK has worked with states to strengthen their nuclear security 
systems for many years, both bilaterally and through multilateral working-
level partnerships such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism (GICNT). Through its Global Threat Reduction Programme 
(GTRP), the UK has delivered a wide range of projects aimed at securing 
or removing civil nuclear and radioactive materials, as well as promoting 
permanent threat reduction through the adoption of alternative.42 This 
important and broad spectrum of activities must be maintained in order to 
ensure that the high-level political interest generated by the NSS is 
translated into practical security improvements.
17.As one of the first adopters of civil nuclear technology, UK government 
and industry has decades of experience implementing nuclear security, 
with world leading expertise across many areas, including 
decommissioning, transport, regulation, nuclear forensics, cyber, physical 
protection and culture. These are shared through the aforementioned 
programmes and relevant IAEA forums although there is scope for this to 
be further expanded.
18.Domestically, the UK has been relatively transparent when it comes to 
releasing information on how it regulates nuclear security, with the UK’s 
Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) publishing a detailed annual report 
which summaries security improvements, compliance by industry and 
incidences. In 2017, the UK started transitioning to a regulatory 
framework based on Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs). This 
enabling approach to regulation is aimed at providing further clarity for 
industry and encouraging the development of new innovative security 
solutions. The UK has also sought advice on how to improve the 
effectiveness of its nuclear security systems from the IAEA, hosting two 
International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions in 
2011 and 2016.43 Other countries are considerably more opaque when it 
comes to sharing information on their domestic nuclear security systems 
and can be unwilling to meaningfully engage with international initiatives 
42 UK International Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security Assistance Programmes, GOV.UK, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/472421/20151030_UC_CBRN_Security_Report.
pdf (2015)
43 How the United Kingdom Seeks to Enhance Nuclear Security with the Help of IPPAS, IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/how-the-
united-kingdom-seeks-to-enhance-nuclear-security-with-the-help-of-ippas (27 February 2017)
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in this area. The UK has and should continue to promote the benefits of a 
transparent and accountable approach to nuclear security and the 
importance of sharing good practice. 
Nuclear Security – Areas for Further Improvement 
19.Despite considerable progress over the past decade, nuclear security this 
is an area that will require continual global investment and attention. 
Particularly given the recent launch of new or expanded nuclear energy 
programmes by a number of states.
20.The political momentum generated by the NSS, has understandably 
slowed since its completion. However, continued interest at this level 
remains vital for ensuring the implementation of commitments made at 
the Summits, further solidifying the international nuclear security regime, 
identifying and addressing gaps and effectively coordinating available 
international assistance. The Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG) was 
established to this end, and benefits from a broad membership of states 
with both developed and developing nuclear programmes. However, 
despite the significant potential of this group to advance global discourse 
and practice its impact to date has arguably been limited. The UK could 
play a leading role in re-energising this initiative and ensuring its goals 
are translated into concrete actions. 
21.Although far more prevalent than nuclear materials, the international 
regime and national-level systems that govern the security of radioactive 
sources remains relatively weak. With these materials falling outside of 
key conventions and being assigned a lower priority within international 
threat reduction programmes. Although the negotiation of a new 
international legal instrument in this area would likely be a significant 
challenge, the UK and others should increase their support for activities 
that strength global radiological source security practice.
22.Military nuclear materials exist considerably further outside of the global 
nuclear security system. Information-sharing arrangements on military 
material security do exist between certain states, although there is 
considerable scope for further confidence building measures. 
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The Challenge of Hypersonic Missile Vehicles
Martin Everett 
Introduction
1. Hypersonic weapons are increasing in number and their inherent characteristics 
risk further destabilising an already disrupted rules-based international order, 
especially in terms of arms control agreements. The UK can reinforce and 
support existing agreements such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, as 
well as mitigate against the deployment of increased numbers of hypersonic 
defences which may encourage development of further nuclear hypersonic 
weapons. It can also develop and support improved space-based early warning 
systems which will reduce some of the destabilising aspects of hypersonic 
weapons. It must bear all these factors in mind if, in the future, there is a 
possibility of deploying hypersonic glide vehicles on its nuclear deterrent. 
2. Hypersonic weapons travel at speeds of over Mach 5 and are also capable of 
aerodynamic flight. This is in contrast to long-range ballistic missiles, which 
although travelling at similar speeds, follows a much better-defined, predictable 
trajectory.
3. Broadly speaking, there are two categories of hypersonic weapons – hypersonic 
cruise missiles, which use supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) engines to 
accelerate to speeds of over Mach 5; and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), 
which ride on a ballistic missile into the atmosphere before being released. As 
they re-enter the atmosphere, they level out and glide, using the velocity 
picked up to manoeuvre at high speed.
4. The ultimate concern for this inquiry is that hypersonic systems are a potential 
platform for delivery of nuclear weapons, though like existing ballistic and 
cruise missiles, they may be dual-capable – that is, they can be used to deliver 
conventional payloads as well. However, their speed and manoeuvrability raise 
a number of additional concerns for their targets. 
5. The first concern is that an extremely fast, manoeuvrable, low-flying nuclear 
weapon shortens the target’s response time considerably, because it is coming 
over the horizon at speed. The second is that the manoeuvrability creates an 
element of ambiguity in what the missile may be targeting – is it heading to its 
target, or is it taking evasive action? Finally, these two problems are 
exacerbated by the problem of warhead ambiguity – hypersonic platforms may 
be dual-capable, carrying either conventional or nuclear payloads.
6. Other nuclear states pursuing hypersonic weapons are the United States (US), 
the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation (Russia) and India.
Role of the Missile Technology Control Regime:
7. One aspect of the rules-based international order are mechanisms which inhibit 
the proliferation of delivery platforms for nuclear weapons. One such 
mechanism is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a non-legally-
binding export control regime of 35 states (of which the UK has been a 
member since 1987) where signatories agree not to export ‘..all delivery 
systems (other than manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass 
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destruction, and of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose 
performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters.’44 
These parameters, as of the last revision of the regime documentation, are a 
payload weight of at least 500 kg deliverable over a range of at least 300km.45
8. At face value, these restrictions should limit the export of some dual-capable 
(i.e. could carry nuclear or conventional payloads) hypersonic weapons to other 
states, assuming they fell within the MTCR range and payload weight 
parameters. However, it should be noted that if a hypersonic weapon is 
sufficiently fast, then the kinetic impact alone would start to become equivalent 
to a high explosive payload, even if it is carrying no explosive payload.46
9. There are catchall provisions in the MTCR that should restrict the export of any 
dual-capable platform. However, greater awareness of the destructive potential 
of a hypersonic weapon from mere impact alone and how this may be a 
possible confounding factor for enforcement of export control is something that 
the UK, as an MTCR member, should encourage.
10.As a useful supplement, an export control list of materials used in components 
of hypersonic weapons was proposed by the RAND Corporation, a US think 
tank, in 2017.47 This list would serve as a useful starting point for explicitly 
restricting the movement of the ingredients of a hypersonic weapon. Any 
amendments to MTCR guidelines would require the building of consensus 
among partners, which the UK can take the lead in facilitating.  
The rise of hypersonic defence:
11.Much of the press coverage surrounding hypersonic weapons resorts to the 
term “unstoppable” - however the drive to develop hypersonic defences (that 
is, defences against hypersonic weapons) has been going on for some time. For 
example, the US’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defence Extended Range 
(THAAD-ER) program provides the interceptor missile with a second boost 
stage in order to push it towards hypersonic speeds. The Russian 40N6E 
missile, developed for their S-400 and S-500 missile defence systems, is 
claimed by their domestic press outlets to be able to shoot down hypersonic 
weapons.48 
12.The true concern here is not that these weapons are unstoppable – it is the 
belief that they can be stopped. The proliferation of hypersonic defences as well 
as hypersonic weapons risks a return to a manner of arms racing observed 
between the US and USSR during the Cold War, which was ultimately capped 
with both limitations on offensive weapons, but on defensive weapons as well, 
in the form of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). Not only may there be a 
race for greater and greater numbers of offensive weapons, but there may also 
be a race for greater and greater numbers of defensive weapons, with states 
44 “Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers”. Missile Technology Control Regime, §1. Accessed January 14, 2019. <Link> 
45 “Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): Annex Handbook 2017”. Missile Technology Control Regime. Accessed January 14, 2019. <Link> 
46 Using the simplest expression for kinetic energy, (𝐸 =  12𝑚𝑣2), a object would only need to have a mass of approximately 90 kilograms 
travelling at Mach 20 to produce an impact equivalent to 500 kg of TNT – if those flight speeds have indeed been attained, and maintained to the 
point of impact. 
47 Speier, Richard H., George Nacouzi, Carrie Lee, and Richard M. Moore, Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class 
of Weapons. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. <Link>
48 E.g. “Specs of Russia’s new missile capable of hitting hyper-sonic targets ‘revealed’”, Russia Today, August 28, 2018. Accessed January 14, 
2019. <Link>
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attempting to avoid giving an advantage to their opponents in either defence or 
offence.
13.There are some permutations of two competing states’ nuclear offensive and 
defensive capabilities which risk inducing further instability, in addition to the 
instabilities provoked by hypersonic offensive weapons. For example, one state 
may believe it is in their interests to engage in a first strike to take out a 
sufficient number of enemy nuclear weapons to make it easier to mop up a 
second strike with their defences, and “survive” a nuclear exchange in this 
manner. Alternatively, it may induce increasingly dangerous mutual arms 
racing of offensive nuclear weapons and defensive weapons in an attempt to 
blunt an opponent’s perceived advantage.
14.Several different technologies are being pursued as possible alternatives to 
intercept hypersonic weapons. The first, directed energy weapons, use powerful 
laser beams to disable a missile. Numerous states are working on these 
systems, including the UK, US, China, Russia, and India. Current limiting 
factors are the power of the beam needed to penetrate the atmosphere and 
sufficiently damage the missile,49 and tracking increasingly faster targets like 
hypersonic weapons in order to actually strike them with the beam.50 
15.The second technology is a reprise of space-based defensive layers. Michael D. 
Griffin, US Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, has 
spoken on several occasions in Congress to encourage the use of space-based 
missile defences.51 The 2019 Missile Defense Review recently published by the 
US Department of Defense states that a “new and near-term examination of 
the concepts and technology for space-based defenses” will take place, and 
that there may be an advantage in deploying such defences as they can 
destroy enemy missiles over their country of origin52 - however, this may well 
be perceived as an existential threat in countries such as Russia.53  
16.Problematic also is the historical context in which a proliferation of hypersonic 
defences would take place. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
characterised the building of the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, and the 
Kinzhal hypersonic cruise missile, as a response to the 2002 US withdrawal 
from the ABMT.54 A return to such a treaty, amended and updated for the post-
Cold War era, that limits the deployment of both ballistic missile and 
hypersonic defences may break this cycle from being repeated.
17.However, should hypersonic weapons proliferate, an additional space-based 
early warning layer capable of tracking hypersonic weapons in flight may 
increase the size of the response window in the event of an attack. The space 
layer should not be neglected, as it is a means of protecting the UK and its 
allies.  The importance of improved space-based sensing capability has also 
been acknowledged in the US 2019 Missile Defense Review.55
49 Ward, Robert Hunter. “The Dawn of Anti-Personnel Directed Energy Weapons.” RealClearDefense. July 24, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019. 
<Link> 
50 Fedasiuk, Ryan; & Reif, Kingston. “Reasons to Doubt Laser Missile Defense.” Arms Control Now. May 14, 2018. Accessed January 15, 2019. 
<Link> 
51 E.g. “Space-Based Missile Defense.” C-SPAN. September 4, 2018. Acccessed January 15, 2018. <Link> 
52 “Missile Defense Review 2019.” US Department of Defence, January 17, 2018: pp. 36-37. Accessed January 17, 2018. 
53 Bartles, Charles K. “Russian Threat Perception and the Ballistic Missile Defense System.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 
(April 27, 2018): pp. 152-169.
54 Putin, Vladimir. “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. Website of The President of Russia. March 1, 2018. Acccessed January 15, 2019. 
<Link> 
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18.Recommendations here are for the UK to facilitate dialogue which will mitigate 
potential arms racing between states developing hypersonic weapons, which 
may require the limitation of hypersonic defences as well by some kind of 
agreement similar to the ABMT.  Early warning systems in space must be 
preserved and expanded, which could be incorporated under the UK’s Defence 
Space Strategy.
The future of the UK nuclear deterrent
19.Finally, a future decision may have to be made as to whether the UK retains a 
“classic” ballistic warhead on its nuclear missiles, or whether the decision is 
taken to pursue a hypersonic glide vehicle.
20.It is possible that a US-designed candidate successor missile to the Trident D5 
is better - or even exclusively - suited to being tipped with nuclear hypersonic 
glide vehicles. Should this decision arise, the UK must be conscious of the 
consequences of the adoption of such a system, and this context in which it 
takes place – issues this brief summary has endeavoured to highlight.
55 “Missile Defense Review 2019.” US Department of Defence, January 17, 2018: p. 36. Accessed January 17, 2018. 
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Brexit and ‘Regime Complexity’ In Global Nuclear Diplomacy
Dr Benjamin Kienzle
Introduction
1. After the ‘golden age’ of nuclear non-proliferation in the 1990s, the 
‘nuclear non-proliferation regime’ – a complex set of different 
international agreements and institutions with the 1970 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its centre – has come under increasing 
pressure. At the same time, the United Kingdom, historically one of the 
staunchest defenders and promoters of the existing nuclear non-
proliferation regime, faces in the wake of Brexit its most significant 
foreign policy realignment in a generation. This submission examines this 
double challenge in greater depth and outlines the United Kingdom’s role 
in global nuclear diplomacy post-Brexit. It argues that the UK needs to 
double up its efforts to mitigate these challenges in both the short- and 
long-term and to maintain its leadership role in global nuclear diplomacy. 
At the same time, global nuclear diplomacy offers an opportunity to turn 
‘Global Britain’ into reality after Brexit.
The Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation ‘Regime Complex’
2. Over the last few decades, nation states have created a complex web of 
dozens of international institutions and agreements to prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons, the so-called nuclear non-proliferation ‘regime 
complex’. On the whole, this ‘regime complex’ has made a significant 
contribution to the mitigation of nuclear proliferation concerns in 
comparison with what was expected in the 1960s. Yet, in spite of its 
relative effectiveness, a number of challenges remain. The four most 
important ones are listed below.
3. Proliferation concerns: Although concrete proliferation concerns have 
somehow diminished during the last decade, countries such as North 
Korea remain as stark reminders that the norms and rules of the nuclear 
non-proliferation ‘regime complex’ are not universally followed.
4. Inequality: Unusually for international law, the NPT has created two 
separate categories of states: nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states, each with different rights and obligations. This inequality 
has created a latent conflict between the former and the latter category of 
states, which pervades the whole ‘regime complex’. In recent years, the 
confrontation between (some) non-nuclear weapon states and the nuclear 
weapon states has intensified due to the perceived lack of progress 
regarding nuclear disarmament. This confrontation makes any kind of 
progress of the ‘regime complex’ more complicated.
5. Decreasing belief in multilateralism: In light of the unilateral US 
withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran as well as in light of the 
preference of earlier US administrations for ‘coalitions of the willing’ (e.g. 
in the form of the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative) instead of 
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formal treaties or organizations, has shed doubts on the continuing US 
belief in the existing institutions and agreements of the nuclear non-
proliferation ‘regime complex’ and its unfettered commitment to upholding 
the norms and rules of the ‘regime complex’ in the future. While other 
nation states may also question the effectiveness of multilateralism in the 
fight against nuclear proliferation, the US role will be crucial. In the long-
term, the stability of the whole ‘regime complex’ is at stake.
6. Complexity: The complexity of the ‘regime complex’ itself is a challenge. 
In other words, the ‘regime complex’ has not been based on a 
manageable number of clearly defined agreements and institutions as in 
the case of other weapon categories. It has rather grown into an intricate 
maze of international treaties, intergovernmental organisations, 
conventions, protocols and informal institutions with overlapping 
membership and mandates, in particular regarding the three basic 
principles of the regime, namely non-proliferation as such, peaceful use of 
nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. This turns the coherent and 
comprehensive management of the ‘regime complex’ into a real challenge.56
The Challenges of Brexit in the Context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
‘Regime Complex’
7. Points 3 to 6 constitute formidable challenges to the UK’s approach to 
global nuclear diplomacy, which will not be made easier by Brexit. Yet, on 
a more positive note, Brexit is not expected to form a major immediate 
challenge to the UK’s nuclear diplomacy efforts: first, because the 
institutional integration between the UK and the EU in the field of non-
proliferation is comparatively low, making the separation between the two 
easier; second, because there are no major differences between the UK 
and the EU consensus on non-proliferation in terms of interests and policy 
preferences, making post-Brexit conflict between the two unlikely; and 
thirdly, because the UK remains a full member of each and every 
institution and agreement of the nuclear non-proliferation ‘regime 
complex’ post-Brexit (with the exception of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM); see point 10). None the less, Brexit may weaken 
the UK’s nuclear diplomacy, especially in the mid- and long-term.
8. Loss of allies: EU member states are key allies of the UK in its nuclear 
non-proliferation efforts. The clearest example, in this regard, is the E3 
group in the negotiations with Iran. In the wake of the revelations about 
clandestine nuclear activities in Iran, the UK established with fellow EU 
member states France and Germany this group in 2003. Ever since, the 
E3 have formed the core group of the international efforts to find a 
negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. Through this group, 
the UK has been able to play a key role in the negotiations with Iran, 
which culminated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 
Although the E3 format in itself is not an EU institution, the E3 is 
intimately linked to the EU. This raises the question in how far the E3 as a 
distinct group can survive Brexit. EU member states that do not form part 
of the E3 may question the legitimacy of E3 leadership in the EU, if one of 
its members ceases to be an EU member. For the same reasons, it will be 
56 See Benjamin Kienzle, ‘Atoms untangled: Examining the implications of “regime complexity” in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons’, paper prepared for the 2017 International Studies Association Annual Convention, Baltimore (United States), 24 February 2017.
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difficult to replicate the E3 model after Brexit, which might close one of 
the most effective options for the UK to work with like-minded allies in 
global nuclear diplomacy.57
9. Reputational costs: Considering point 5 above, the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU can be seen by other nation states as setting a bad example. That 
is, other nation states might question the UK’s unfettered commitment to 
international institutions and agreements. As a consequence, the UK’s 
efforts to underpin the existing institutions and agreements of the nuclear 
non-proliferation ‘regime complex’ might suffer in the future. Although at 
present there is no evidence that this is the case in the field of non-
proliferation, it is important to keep in mind that most agreements in this 
area have withdrawal clauses. This issue is most acute regarding Article X 
of the NPT, where the UK traditionally supports a stricter interpretation.
10.Misperception of UK safeguards system: A fundamental element of the 
nuclear non-proliferation ‘regime complex’ is the international safeguards 
system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ensures 
that civilian nuclear material is not diverted for military purposes. 
Generally, non-nuclear weapon states are subject to a strict safeguards 
system covering all their nuclear facilities, while safeguards in nuclear 
weapon states cover only their civilian nuclear installations. In practical 
terms, nuclear safeguards are implemented domestically and verified by 
the independent international inspectorate of the IAEA. In EU member 
states, however, the domestic element is carried out at the European 
level, i.e. by EURATOM, which is formally an organization separate from 
the EU, but governed by the EU institutions. Since the UK government 
decided to withdraw from both the EU and EURATOM, the UK had to 
establish a domestic safeguards system to replace EURATOM’s regional 
safeguards system. The Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 empowered the 
Office of Nuclear Regulation to carry this out. Although the UK appears to 
make good progress in this regard, the danger is that the replacement of 
a regional safeguards system with a domestic one could create the 
impression that the UK lowers the standards of its safeguards. This is 
particularly problematic in the context of point 4 above. Given the 
inequality between non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states 
(not least regarding the extent of their respective safeguards system) 
such an impression could increase the perceived grievances of non-
nuclear weapon states and increase their unhappiness with the ‘regime 
complex’ as a whole.58
11.Funding of international non-proliferation institutions: Since the adoption 
of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction in 2003, a cornerstone of EU activities in this field has been 
the (voluntary) funding of relevant international organizations, including 
the IAEA, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization or the G8 Global Partnership against the 
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. This has made an 
57 See Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi and Benjamin Kienzle, ‘Legitimation Strategies of Informal Groups of States: The Case of the E3 in the Nuclear 
Negotiations with Iran’, paper presented at the 12th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Prague (Czech Republic), 15 September 
2018.
58 See Robert J Downes, ‘Safeguarding Britain’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations After Brexit’, Commentary, Royal United Service Institute, 5 
February 2018, available at: https://rusi.org/commentary/safeguarding-britain%E2%80%99s-nuclear-non-proliferation-obligations-after-brexit
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important contribution to the functioning of the nuclear non-proliferation 
‘regime complex’, for example regarding nuclear security. As an EU 
member state, the UK is an integral part of these efforts to underpin the 
‘regime complex’. But after Brexit, the UK will not be associated with them 
anymore. Assuming that the UK wants to be seen as a key pillar of the 
‘regime complex’ post-Brexit, the challenge will be how the UK can 
compensate this loss with own funding for international non-proliferation 
institutions and programmes.59
Overcoming the Challenges: ‘Global Britain’ in Global Nuclear Diplomacy
12.Taken together, points 8 to 11 form a set of important challenges that the 
UK needs to overcome to retain its leading role in global nuclear 
diplomacy and to address effectively the global challenges in points 3 to 6. 
If done properly, global nuclear diplomacy offers an important opportunity 
to sharpen the UK’s international profile post-Brexit and to shape what 
‘Global Britain’ is in reality. To this end, this submission offers two sets of 
recommendations.
UK Role regarding the Nuclear Non-proliferation ‘Regime Complex’
13.Any international leadership role requires expertise and funding. In the 
context of Brexit, it is important to make sure that the UK maintains its 
high level of expertise in the nuclear field and increases the funding for 
the actions outlined in point 14 to substitute EU funding with domestic 
funding (see point 11). It is also necessary to reinforce the cross-
government approach to nuclear non-proliferation, including the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Atomic Weapons 
Establishment.
14.The UK should strengthen its image as a ‘good nuclear citizen’ through 
concrete actions that strengthen the different pillars of the ‘nuclear non-
proliferation regime’, in particular non-proliferation and disarmament (see 
point 9). This could include voluntary contributions to relevant activities of 
international non-proliferation institutions (see point 9 and 11) or bilateral 
(disarmament) initiatives such as the UK-Norway Initiative on Nuclear 
Warhead Dismantlement Verification (see point 4).
15.Working with allies is key in global nuclear diplomacy, as the Iran case 
has shown (see point 8). Therefore, the UK needs to double up its efforts 
to establish a ‘group of friends’ (alongside the P5), on which it can rely in 
global nuclear diplomacy. It could follow the example of key allies such as 
Australia, Canada and Germany that established the Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament Initiative in 2010. Likewise, the UK should make an extra 
effort to maintain the current working relationship with France and 
Germany.
16.Managing complexity (see point 6) could become a novel approach for the 
UK to sharpen its profile in global nuclear diplomacy. To this end, the UK 
could focus on strengthening the coordination work done by certain key 
institutions. For example, the 1540 Committee of the United Nations (UN) 
59 See Benjamin Kienzle, ‘A European Contribution to Non-Proliferation? The EU WMD Strategy at Ten’, International Affairs 89.5 (2013), pp. 1143–
1159.
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Security Council sits at the centre of many international efforts regarding 
nuclear security and has ‘orchestrated’ the work carried out by other 
institutions in this area. At present, however, the 1540 Committee is 
institutionally weak. Therefore, the UK could reinvigorate the idea to 
establish a formal 1540 Secretariat, which the UK proposed originally 
when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in 2004. Such a 
1540 Secretariat would be in an institutionally more powerful position to 
coordinate other nuclear security institutions and make complexity more 
manageable.
UK Role regarding the 2020 NPT Review Conference
17.Another area where the UK could sharpen its international profile in the 
short-term is the 2020 NPT Review Conference. As a matter of fact, due 
to its timing, the Review Conference will be an important ‘test case’ for 
the UK’s nuclear diplomacy post-Brexit.
18.In this regard, the UK should adopt, first of all, an active and cooperative 
role in the Review Conference aimed at the successful outcome of the 
conference, ideally in the form of a substantive final declaration.
19.Furthermore, the UK should coordinate its approach with EU member 
states and other like-minded countries to maximize the effectiveness.
20.The UK needs be prepared to offer good evidence to counter any 
allegations that the new domestic safeguards system post-Brexit does not 
lower the safeguards standards in the UK (see point 10). An NPT Review 
Conference Working Paper could be helpful in this regard.
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The Future of U.S.-Russia Arms Control: The Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) and New START Treaties 
Dr James Cameron
Summary
1. Together the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) constitute the basis of the 
U.S.-Russian arms control regime. Given the importance of these agreements 
and London’s key interests in the continuity of the INF Treaty and New 
START, the United Kingdom should pursue a number of initiatives designed to 
preserve their benefits. If the U.S. suspends its obligations under the INF 
Treaty, the UK should push within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) for a dual-track policy, insisting that any deployments of U.S. 
intermediate-range systems to NATO Europe should be coupled with 
diplomatic efforts aimed at the elimination of these weapons from the 
continent. Secondly, in advance of a U.S. decision on New START extension, 
the United Kingdom should continue to underline the importance of the treaty 
to European security, both bilaterally in Washington and within NATO. Thirdly, 
the UK should continue to strengthen its already-significant capacity as a hub 
for non-governmental thinking and dialogue on the long-term future of 
nuclear arms control.
The INF Treaty and New START
2. Under the terms of the 1987 INF Treaty, both the U.S. and USSR committed 
to eliminate from their arsenals all conventional and nuclear ground-based 
cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km, 
dismantling hundreds of modern offensive systems. The treaty also banned 
the testing and production of new weapons of this type.60 
3. The INF Treaty enhanced strategic stability by banning missiles with relatively 
short flight times. Intermediate-range ballistic missile systems such as the 
SS-20 and Pershing II were reputed to take as little as six minutes to reach 
their targets in the USSR and NATO Europe, giving the enemy virtually no 
warning of a nuclear strike.61 Cruise missiles were hard to detect in flight, also 
decreasing warning times. By eliminating these systems, the INF Treaty 
reduced fears of a surprise nuclear attack on both sides. 
4. Signed in April 2010, New START reduced both U.S. and Russian strategic 
forces to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 800 deployed and non-
deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long-range bomber aircraft. These limits 
represent a 30 per cent drop in deployed warheads and a 50 per cent 
reduction in launchers from those agreed in previous treaties. New START will 
expire in February 2021, with an option to extend its provisions by mutual 
agreement for an additional five years (i.e. to February 2026).62
60 ‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at a Glance’, Arms Control Association (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty, accessed 
8 January 2018); James Cameron, ‘The Impending Demise of the INF Treaty: Britain Has a Job on Its Hands’, 22 October 2018, RUSI Commentary 
(https://rusi.org/commentary/impending-demise-inf-treaty-britain-has-job-its-hands, accessed 8 January 2018). 
61 Michael Getler, ‘Pershing II Missile: Why It Alarms the Soviets’, Washington Post, 17 March 1982 
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/03/17/pershing-ii-missile-why-it-alarms-soviets/, accessed 8 January 2018). 
62 ‘New START at a Glance’, Arms Control Association (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART, accessed 8 January 2018). 
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5. In addition to marking further steps in the reduction of the two nuclear 
superpowers’ strategic arsenals, New START’s limitations provide both 
Washington and Moscow with a measure of predictability in planning their 
nuclear forces. Through its wide-ranging verification mechanisms, including 
on-site inspections, exchanges of missile telemetry and other data, as well as 
allowances for unilateral monitoring of compliance by both parties, New 
START also provides a high level of transparency regarding the status and 
future development of both sides’ strategic nuclear arsenals, thereby 
increasing mutual confidence.63 
UK Interests
6. Both the INF Treaty and New START benefit UK and European security by 
limiting the scope of U.S.-Russian arms competition. In addition to the 
general importance of measures designed to prevent nuclear miscalculation, 
the special place of Europe in both Washington and Moscow’s foreign policy 
make arms control between the two particularly relevant to the continent’s 
security. While a bolt-from-the-blue attack by one on the homeland of the 
other is almost unthinkable, more plausible scenarios in which nuclear 
weapons may be used by the United States or Russia involve escalation from 
a crisis involving NATO Europe, for example stemming from an incident in the 
Baltic region. Thus measures leading to the lowering of the risk of nuclear 
confrontation between the United States and Russia are of particular 
importance to the UK and Europe more broadly.
7. The demise of the INF Treaty would have a significant impact on UK security. 
The elimination of intermediate-range forces through the treaty removed a 
direct threat to the UK and NATO of Soviet nuclear systems that were 
specifically designed to wage nuclear war in Europe. Any future intermediate-
range Russian systems would by their nature be aimed at targets in NATO 
Europe, most likely including the UK. However, any U.S. deployment of 
offsetting systems to Europe would be politically divisive, with NATO member 
states splitting over the security benefits of the new weapons versus the 
prospect of a new arms race in Europe and/or the domestic political 
controversy involved in hosting new U.S. weapons on their soil. 
8. New START’s specific benefits to the UK are twofold. Firstly, the treaty 
provides a baseline for assessing the U.S. nuclear deterrent guarantee to the 
United Kingdom and NATO. Were the treaty to lapse without a replacement 
and a new arms race to begin, it would become more difficult to assess the 
strategic balance between Washington and Moscow, thereby making 
estimation of the adequacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent guarantee a more 
complex and potentially error-prone process. Secondly, the treaty provides 
the United Kingdom with predictability regarding the state of Russian strategic 
nuclear forces, facilitating its own nuclear force planning.
9. Finally, both the INF Treaty and New START help to uphold the UK’s interest 
in the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Both treaties give 
substance to the nuclear powers’ Article VI commitment under the NPT to 
work towards cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. Without 
these two agreements, there would be very little left to substantiate this 
63 ‘New START’, United States Department of State (https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/, accessed 8 January 2019). 
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commitment, thereby weakening the NPT as a cornerstone of the global non-
proliferation regime. 
Immediate Challenges
10. The most pressing challenge to the INF Treaty comes from alleged Russian 
noncompliance. The U.S. Department of State first declared Russia in 
violation of the treaty in 2014, claiming that it had tested a ground-launched 
cruise missile within the prohibited range.64 Since then, the United States 
has named the missile as the 9M729 (NATO designation SSC-8) and NATO 
allies have broadly endorsed the U.S. position.65 Moscow denies the charges 
levelled against it. In October 2018, President Trump declared his intention 
to withdraw from the treaty and in December Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo announced that the U.S. would suspend its participation in 60 days 
if Russia did not come back into compliance with the treaty. If Russia fails to 
satisfy U.S. concerns by early February 2019 – a very remote prospect – the 
United States will in all likelihood suspend its obligations and give notice of 
its intention to withdraw from the treaty. It is highly probable, therefore, 
that the INF Treaty will cease to exist in 2019. 
11. President Trump’s INF announcement and the resulting ultimatum is part of 
a newly sceptical attitude from his administration towards nuclear arms 
control as a tool of statecraft. Notably, the Trump administration has made 
no commitment to extend New START for an additional five years beyond 
February 2021. When President Putin broached the option of renewal, 
President Trump reputedly criticised New START as a “bad deal” brokered by 
his predecessor.66 This comes at the same time as President Trump has 
withdrawn the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) governing Iran’s nuclear programme and published a new Nuclear 
Posture Review that places far more emphasis on the emergence of a new 
great-power nuclear competition at the expense of arms control. In short, 
Trump’s animosity towards New START combined with the general attitude 
of the administration towards arms control indicates that the President 
Trump is likely to let New START expire in 2021 with no follow-on 
agreement.
Long-Term Issues
12. Even if New START were to be extended, differences between the 
Washington and Moscow on missile defence would place the long-term future 
of the U.S.-Russia arms control regime in doubt. Since its withdrawal from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, the United States has consistently 
resisted Russian attempts to include missile defence in arms-control 
agreements. Moscow, claiming that U.S. missile defence systems could 
endanger its nuclear deterrent, issued a unilateral statement at the time of 
New START’s signature, saying that the treaty would be ‘effective and viable 
64 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2014 (https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf, 
accessed 8 January 2019). 
65 ‘Brussels Summit Declaration,’ 11 July 2018 (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm, accessed 8 January 2019). 
66 Jonatahn Landay and David Rohde, ‘In call with Putin, Trump denounced Obama-era nuclear arms treaty – sources,’ 9 February 2017 
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-putin-idUSKBN15O2A5, accessed 10 January 2019). 
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only’ if the U.S. did not build up its defensive systems.67 Since then, Russia 
has prioritized the limitation of missile defences as part of any follow-on 
agreement to New START.68 This standoff will need to be addressed for 
strategic arms control to move forward beyond 2026.
13. In addition to missile defence, there are a number of emerging technologies 
that are likely to challenge the nature of nuclear deterrence and hence arms 
control. Hypersonic weapons, able to fly at speeds of over 5,000km per 
hour, could shorten warning times in advance of an attack, increasing 
instability in ways similar to U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range systems in 
the past.69 Cyber capabilities could challenge deterrence in a number of 
ways, allowing an attacker to disable an opponent’s nuclear command and 
control system, or dramatically enhancing states’ abilities to track and target 
the nuclear arsenals of their adversaries, thereby potentially making a first 
strike more feasible.70
14. Finally the impact that the rise of China will have on arms control is still an 
open question. While factoring into both sides’ considerations, Beijing has 
not been a party to U.S.-Russia arms control agreements. The United States 
and Russia still possess nuclear arsenals several times as large as China’s, 
suggesting that the status quo could conceivably continue. At the same time, 
however, Chinese development of other capabilities, including a land-based 
intermediate-range ballistic missile force of the type banned under the INF 
Treaty, has been used by some in the United States as an argument for why 
the current arms-control regime is no longer fit for purpose. Moscow has 
also raised the prospect of including third countries in strategic arms 
reductions.71 As China grows in importance, these dilemmas will only 
become more significant. 
Ways Forward
15. If the United States withdraws from the INF Treaty, the UK should press for 
a dual-track approach to any new U.S. missile deployments to NATO Europe. 
Based on the successful policy adopted by NATO in 1979, the position would 
state that any deployments of new intermediate-range missiles to NATO 
states should be accompanied by sustained diplomatic engagement with 
Moscow aimed at a new treaty to eliminate these systems from the European 
continent, be it through a U.S.-Russia treaty covering Europe only, or some 
form of global agreement covering Russia, the United States, and China. 
Such a policy would provide a point of compromise between those NATO 
states pushing for new U.S. systems and those fearful of a new arms race in 
Europe and/or domestic political controversy over new U.S. deployments.
67 ‘Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense’, 7 April 2010 (https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/140187.htm, accessed 10 
January 2018). 
68 Amy F. Woolf, ‘The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions’, September 27, 2018, 39 (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf, 
accessed 14 January 2018).
69 Richard H. Speier, et al, Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons (RAND Corporation, 2017) 
(https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html, accessed 10 January 2019). 
70 Paul Bracken, ‘The Cyber Threat to Nuclear Stability’, Orbis Vol.60, No.2, 188-203 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2016.02.002, accessed 10 
January 2019).
71 Woolf, ‘New START,’ 39.
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16. In the case of New START, the UK should use its close contacts with the U.S. 
government to press the case for New START extension, underlining the 
importance the UK places on the treaty’s provision of a more stable and 
predictable strategic environment. It should also coordinate with other NATO 
states to make the case for New START, stressing the importance of the 
treaty for maintaining strategic stability and hence a conducive environment 
for the continuation of the United States’ nuclear-deterrent guarantee to the 
Alliance.
17. Regarding the long-term outlook, the UK should continue to develop its 
capacity for strategic thought in this field. This capability takes various 
forms, including home-grown expertise in the fields of nuclear security, arms 
control, missile defence, cyber warfare and emerging technologies at think 
tanks and universities, as well as the UK’s considerable convening power for 
non-governmental, or semi-official (Track 2 and Track 1.5) international 
dialogues through venues such as the Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI), the European Leadership Network, Chatham House, and Wilton Park. 
Only through a combination of deep research on in this field, as well as 
mutual understanding between countries of future challenges and ways to 
overcome them, will a way forward be found.
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Global Nuclear Diplomacy and the Quest for a WMD Free Middle East
Dr Hassan Elbahtimy
1. Since 1995, this issue has played an important, and sometimes 
overbearing, role during the NPT review process. It is likely to be a key 
issue in the forthcoming 2020 NPT Review Conference. In NPT meetings, 
almost all state parties refer to the importance of the issue in their 
opening statements. The issue has also become weaved into the 
institutional fabric of the review process and dominates discussions in 
Subsidiary Body 2 in NPT Review Conferences. How a review conference 
handles the issue of the zone has become one of the factors that 
determines whether a conference is headed for success or failure. 
2. The idea behind establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction 
in the Middle East commands wide international appeal as one way to deal 
with several inter-linked issues. Such a zone would extend the 
membership of the NPT, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and bring these 
international instruments close to universality. It would address the sense 
of double standards that Arab states and Iran feel toward the way Israel’s 
nuclear programme is handled. It could be the answer to tensions over 
Iran’s nuclear and ballistic ambitions and fears of regional proliferation in 
reaction to it. Yet despite repeated calls for the establishment of a zone 
free of weapons of mass destruction in the region and the wide support 
the idea commands internationally, progress towards achieving that goal 
remains minimal. 
The regional landscape
3. Israel is the only regional state that has nuclear weapons. According to 
the SIPRI 2018 Year Book, it has an inventory of 80 nuclear warheads; 
and refuses to join the NPT. While in South Asia both India and Pakistan 
are also outside the treaty, in the Middle East the Arab States and Iran 
are state parties. This imbalance creates a sense of deep frustration in the 
region. Israel’s official policy is not to declare its possession of nuclear 
weapons. Experts have used the label ‘nuclear opacity/ambiguity’ to 
describe this policy where Israel never explicitly acknowledges or actively 
denies possession of nuclear weapons. 
4. Several NPT state parties in the region have faced allegation of non-
compliance and been accused of secretly building nuclear weapons. This 
list includes Iraq and Libya and recently Iran. None of these states are 
currently in possession of nuclear weapons and the Iraqi and Libyan 
nuclear programmes have been dismantled. The Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action currently applies verifiable constraints on Iran’s nuclear 
programme. If freed from these constraints, Iran’s nuclear programme 
has the potential to fuel a regional arms race that could further complicate 
efforts for the establishment of the zone.
5. While nuclear weapons have long been recognised as the key hurdle to 
the establishment of the zone, recent developments have shown how 
other weapon systems can also pose significant problems. The repeated 
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use of chemical weapons within the context of the Syrian Civil War has 
highlighted the regional gaps in membership of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Egypt, Israel and South Sudan are the only three regional 
states outside that international convention. Also, active missile 
programmes in Israel and Iran pose a challenge to a region-wide 
curtailment of missile capabilities. Additionally a number of regional states 
are yet to join the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, notably 
Egypt, Israel and Syria. 
Diplomatic efforts
6. In 1974, Egypt (under Sadat) and Iran (under the Shah) made the first 
formal multilateral proposal for the establishment of a nuclear weapons 
free zone in the Middle East. This took the form of a resolution presented 
to the UN and then tabled regularly ever since. In 1980, Israel joined the 
international consensus in support of establishing a zone free of nuclear 
weapons in the region by voting for that resolution. Yet despite that vote, 
the proposal got no nearer to becoming a reality during the decade.
7. It was in the ’90s that the issue acquired growing prominence both 
regionally and internationally. In 1990, Egypt presented an initiative 
broadening the scope of the proposed zone to include chemical and 
biological weapons in addition to nuclear weapons. The idea entailed a 
bargain where Israel would give up nuclear weapons while other regional 
states would formally abandon chemical and biological weapons. Since 
then, the concept of WMDFZ has gained prominence over a nuclear-only 
free zone.
8. The first regional discussion on the issue started with the Madrid Peace 
Process launched in 1991. This established a series of bilateral tracks 
between Israel and individual Arab states - a peace treaty with Jordan 
was signed in 1994. Parallel to these negotiations, a multilateral track was 
formed of five working groups dealing with region-wide issues. One of 
these groups dealt with ‘arms control and regional security.’ The group 
met in six plenaries from 1992-1994 with several intercessional events 
organised between the plenaries. 
9. The Madrid Peace Process allowed direct discussions between Israel and 
other regional states on the issue but also enabled several track II events. 
However, it was not able to achieve any significant breakthroughs. First, 
the window for regional reconciliation soon closed with the derailment of 
the peace process. Second, the discussion highlighted the different visions 
that the Arab states and Israel held on the issue. Arabs states argued that 
Israel was not serious about discussing denuclearisation while Israel 
argued that Arabs were not willing to entertain security confidence 
building measures. From that point on, these different views prevail. 
10.It was in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that the 
relationship between the NPT and the WMDFZ proposal got intimately 
intertwined. During that conference, the NPT, which had originally had an 
intended lifespan of 25 years, was indefinitely extended through a 
package deal that included a resolution specifically endorsing the 
establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. The resolution was adopted 
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after relentless campaigning by Arab states using the debate about treaty 
extension as leverage. 
11.Since the 1995 conference, the lack of progress toward establishing the 
zone has come under the spotlight of subsequent NPT review conferences. 
The 2010 conference saw the emergence of an idea of convening a 
conference in 2012, to be attended by all states in the Middle East “on the 
establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other 
weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived 
at by the states of the region, and with the full support and engagement 
of the nuclear-weapon states”. A Finnish facilitator was appointed and a 
series of meetings were organised and attended by some regional states 
but agreement on the agenda and modalities of the conference remained 
elusive. 
12.The 2015 conference failed in part due to disagreements about how to 
address the lapsed 2012 conference on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone. An 
Arab proposal called for the UN Secretary General to step in to convene 
the conference within 180 days, and defined some of the main parameters 
for such a Conference. This was opposed by the US, UK and some other 
states on the grounds that the Arab group proposals were too prescriptive 
and unrealistic. Instead, these states advocated for the continuation of 
regional consultations to agree on the time frame and agenda of such a 
conference.  
13.The issue is still deadlocked. In 2018, Arab states sponsored a resolution 
that asked the UN to convene a weeklong WMDFZ Conference in 2019. 
The resolution was supported by 103 countries, 71 abstained. Only the 
United States, Israel, and Micronesia voted against. Details about that 
conference are yet to be announced.
What can the UK do?
14.UK’s commitment to a rule-based global order and the viability of the 
treaty makes engagement with the issue unavoidable. Realistically, there 
is little prospect for progress on the issue without significant input and 
mediation from actors outside the region. 
15.The UK’s position as one of three depository states of the NPT (alongside 
Russia and the US) lays some responsibilities and expectations on its 
shoulders. Because of this special role, the UK has been already been 
involved in some of the initiatives. For example, the UK co-sponsored for 
the 1995 Middle East resolution as part of the NPT indefinite extension 
package. In 2010, the NPT review conference named the UK as one of 
three state conveners for the 2012 conference on the zone.
16.In engaging with the issue, the UK needs to distance itself from taking 
sides in the polarised debate between regional actors and instead carve its 
role as principled and pragmatic champion of the NPT and the norms it 
embodies. Any watering down of such commitment would expose the 
treaty, and the regime it upholds, to accusations of double standards and 
undermines its authority in the region. 
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17.There is an opportunity for the UK to promote or sponsor a regional 
dialogue aimed at building consensus toward a vision for regional security 
that excludes reliance on weapons of mass destruction. This can be done 
through an approach that is inclusive of all regional actors. Between the 
depositories, the UK might be best placed to offer its good offices to 
facilitate such a dialogue.
18.The UK could also contribute to the building of regional capacities in arms 
control and verification. Unlike other regions, the Middle East’s experience 
in arms control is limited. Building up these capacities will serve several 
functions. First, any effective regional agreement would entail a key role 
for verification. Second, capacity building could present a tangible 
contribution to the effort to create such a zone.  Finally, it could contribute 
to a better-informed discussion about the actual challenges, solutions and 
opportunities in regional arms control.
China, the United Kingdom and Global Nuclear Diplomacy
Dr Nicola Leveringhaus
Summary
1. The UK and China share commonalities in their approach to nuclear 
diplomacy. At a time when global nuclear diplomacy is shifting away from 
multilateral institutions, and China-US relations are under strain, there are 
opportunities for further cooperation between the UK and China. These 
opportunities include a sustained dialogue on working practices regarding 
the management of a sea-based nuclear deterrent; and joint activities 
concerning verification. More generally, both countries can re-state their 
common commitment to multilateral nuclear diplomacy in the P5 process, 
of which both are members. 
Background
2. Since the late 1980s, China has come to view the UK in an increasingly 
positive and independent light when it comes to nuclear weapons matters. 
During the Cold War, China considered the UK inseparable on nuclear 
matters from the United States, and accused the UK of colluding with the 
superpowers on arms control and non-proliferation to freeze the nuclear 
status quo to their advantage. Today, however, China acknowledges that 
the UK maintains an independent nuclear policy, and likens itself to the 
UK in the nuclear context based on a number of shared characteristics:
a. Preference for minimal forms of deterrence in nuclear strategy (though 
both countries differ in their definition of minimum deterrence); 
b. Middle-sized nuclear arsenal (unlike the UK, China has not officially or 
unilaterally
declared its nuclear arsenal size);
c. Limited set of nuclear weapons delivery platforms. China relies largely 
on a land based nuclear deterrent, the UK on a sea based deterrent.
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That said, China also makes clear certain nuclear related differences from 
the UK: 
a. China is not part of an extended nuclear deterrent arrangement (the 
UK is in NATO);
b. China maintains a de-alerted nuclear force based on a declared pledge, 
since 1964, of No First Use (NFU), unlike the UK.
3. In the 2000s, the UK-China nuclear relationship has deepened, in large 
part because of UK efforts to engage the Chinese in bilateral dialogues 
(tracks 1-2) and the P5 process since 2008/9. The Chinese have been 
receptive to these efforts, for instance by hosting British officers at their 
National Defence University since 2011, and joining the P5 process 
despite early hesitation about the process. 
4. Two main reasons can be offered to explain China’s receptiveness. First, 
China has been making progress in developing, for the first time, a viable 
sea based nuclear deterrent and was likely keen to learn from Britain’s 
longer experience of maintaining SSBNs. Second, the bilateral relationship 
improved more generally from 2012 to 2016, especially in relation to 
economic ties. This is reflected in Chinese investment in the Hinkley Point 
C nuclear power station. The ground was thus fertile for bilateral 
cooperation. Additional interests motivating China might have included 
the UK-Norway verification initiative (notably because this does not 
involve the United States), and more broadly, UK efforts to project itself 
internationally as acting responsibly in the management and reduction of 
its nuclear arsenal. 
Chinese views of Non-proliferation and the Non Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT)
5. Unlike the UK, China is a latecomer to global nuclear diplomacy. 72 China 
signed the NPT in 1992, some two decades after the treaty was 
established. Prior to this, Beijing loudly rejected the NPT in the 1960s and 
1970s, and only began to change its position as the treaty expanded its 
global membership in the 1980s to non-nuclear countries in the 
developing world. China has always cared deeply about diplomacy with 
this part of the world, above and beyond its relations with more developed 
Western countries. It is notable, for instance, that the first international 
nuclear regime China signed and ratified was Protocol II of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco in 1974, in large part because of Mexican pressure to do so.
6. China’s relationship to the NPT and non-proliferation is complex and, in 
certain areas, unique. Upon joining the NPT, China was classified as a 
nuclear weapons state.  This is because China first successfully tested a 
nuclear device on 16 October 1964, before the treaty cut-off date of 1 
January 1967. This treaty recognition has become, intentionally or not, 
politically valuable for China in its nuclear relations with India, which 
tested a nuclear weapon in 1998 and can only join the NPT as a non-
nuclear state. 
72 China was not part of the early negotiations for the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Limited/Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee during the Cold War. For more on this history, see Nicola Horsburgh, China and Global Nuclear Order, from 
estrangement to active engagement (OUP, 2015).
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7. China has a different approach to the so-called ‘three pillars’ of the NPT: 
non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and a disarmament. 
Uniquely, China prioritises the right of equal access to and development of 
peaceful use of nuclear energy for member states above that of non-
proliferation. More broadly, China sympathises with long-standing claims 
of injustice and inequality among non-nuclear member states that nuclear 
disarmament has been abandoned by nuclear member states. For 
example, of the five NPT nuclear states, China has wavered far more in its 
position regarding the Nuclear Ban Treaty and only reluctantly joined a 
recent P5 statement opposing the ban. Finally, China’s suspected 
proliferation past73 casts an enduring negative shadow over its non-
proliferation credentials to a far greater degree than any of the other 
nuclear member states. That said, in the last two decades, China has 
sought to defend the norm of non-proliferation by bolstering its national 
export control system and curtailing the potential illicit proliferation of 
dual-use sensitive materials and technology through Chinese companies.74 
More symbolically, from 2003 to 2008, China hosted the Six Party Talks to 
resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, a difficult role to which it was 
seriously committed.
8. Outside the NPT, China sees institutional value in the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), which it joined in 1996. Compared to the NPT, this 
was a harder treaty to join given the technical constraints the CTBT 
imposed on countries with limited experience of nuclear weapons testing, 
which was the case for China. However, participation in CTBT negotiations 
between 1994 and 1996 was beneficial to China because it offered much 
needed experience in multilateral nuclear diplomacy at a time when it did 
not have a bureau for arms control and disarmament in the Foreign 
Ministry (this was established in 1997). China has not yet ratified the 
CTBT75 but Beijing stresses that it demonstrates compliance through the 
certification of four International Monitoring Systems (IMS) stations on 
Chinese soil in 2017.76 Elsewhere, China has invested in the US led 
nuclear security agenda. Under Xi Jinping, in 2015, China established a 
regional centre of excellence on nuclear security and nuclear security 
featured on the agenda of the first meeting of China’s National Security 
Commission.
9. For China, the biggest challenge facing global nuclear diplomacy today is 
the United States’ undoing or undermining of certain bilateral and 
multilateral nuclear treaties that together underpin a messy, though rules-
based, nuclear order. China fears these developments heighten the 
prospect of an arms race with the United States, dilute the restraining 
effects of a nuclear taboo, and go against political attempts to secure 
strategic stability. These developments did not start with Trump. From 
73 In the early 1990s, reports emerged that Chinese nuclear assistance to countries like Pakistan during the Cold War had extended to the transfer 
of dual-use technology, fissile material and weapons designs. The depth of these relationships remains unclear, though reports continued into the 
2000s. For instance, in 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered a 1960s Chinese nuclear warhead design which had travelled via 
the Pakistani A.Q. Khan network to Libya.  
74 See Wyn Bowen, Daniel Salisbury and Ian Stewart, ‘‘Engaging China in proliferation prevention’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 29 October 2013, 
https://thebulletin.org/2013/10/engaging-china-in-proliferation-prevention-2/; and Daniel Salisbury and Lucy Jones, ‘Exploring the Changing Role of 
Chinese Entities in WMD Proliferation’, The China Quarterly, 2016, Vol. 225, March 2016 , pp. 50-72
75 The reasons for this are mostly strategic, the non-ratification of the United States and the non-membership of India.
76 CTBTO, ‘Remarkable progress: China and CTBTO’, https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2018/remarkable-progress-china-and-the-ctbt/ 
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Beijing’s perspective, they reflect underlying hesitation in US nuclear 
diplomacy (as well as an uneasiness toward treaty commitments), 
reflected in Washington’s abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 
2002/3, and the passing of the US-India civilian nuclear deal in 2008, 
bending Nuclear Supplier Group rules to do so. Under Trump, this trend 
has gained more momentum resulting in US withdrawal from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action over Iran, a blow to China because it 
considered itself an important broker in that deal; and the Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), partly explaining US withdrawal in the 
context of Chinese missile capabilities today. 
10.The above signals to China that the dynamics of global nuclear diplomacy 
are shifting away from multilateralism to more tailored and bespoke 
platforms preferred by the United States. In the past, this has resulted in 
US initiatives like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which China 
refused to join on the grounds that it was a too-intrusive measure for 
non-proliferation. Today, this shift is evident in Trump’s preference for 
bilateral summitry vis-à-vis North Korea. This preference has forced China 
to shift gear in its approach to the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 
away from calling for a resumption of the Six Party Talks to engaging on a 
bilateral level with North Korea itself. Another area relates to verification, 
with US promotion of the International (though US led and funded) 
Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), 77 to which 
China and Russia are not party. The extent to which the IPNDV will 
complement or overshadow the P5 process, which China chairs at present, 
is not yet clear. 
Chinese views of Multilateral Arms Control and Nuclear Disarmament78
11.China publicly supports nuclear disarmament and in January 2017, Xi 
Jinping restated this commitment at the United Nations. China’s dogged 
unilateral promotion of an international NFU treaty since 1971 can also be 
seen as a diplomatic effort towards nuclear disarmament, though a deeply 
unpopular one among other nuclear weapons states. In contrast to its 
support for nuclear disarmament, China has in the past challenged nuclear 
arms control as a global public good. During the Cold War, China 
considered arms control destabilising, as a way for the then superpowers 
to cement nuclear superiority relative to other states, including China. 
12.China has consistently resisted participation in multilateral arms control 
while the United States and Russia maintain such large nuclear arsenals 
compared to other nuclear armed states. China first faced serious 
pressure in this regard following a Soviet proposal for multilateral arms 
control during the INF negotiations in 1983. Back then, China turned to 
the UK and France as a fellow ‘middle sized nuclear power’ in resisting the 
Soviet proposal. After this experience, China demanded substantial 
nuclear force reductions by the superpowers as a precondition to 
participation in any agreements.79 The proposed size of reduction 
77 Dr. Christopher Ashley Ford , Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Conference on "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime - Towards the 2020 NPT Review Conference"
Wilton Park, Wiston House, United Kingdom, 10 December 2018, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/2018/288018.htm 
78 A well-informed House of Lords debate on China and Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament took place in 2012, 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2012-11-22/debates/12112245000887/ChinaMultilateralNuclearDisarmament 
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oscillated from 50% to at least 1,000 warheads each. 80 In 1988, China 
proposed the ‘Three Halts/Cessation and One Reduction’ idea to agree not 
to test, produce, or deploy nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear 
arsenals to an unspecified number below levels being discussed by the 
superpowers.81 
13.More recent Chinese conditions for multilateral arms control are not 
available. However, Chinese nuclear experts have offered helpful, though 
unofficial, conditions in recent years. 82These include: a unilateral 
guarantee to keep nuclear weapons off-alert; a unilateral declaration of an 
official moratorium on fissile material production; and a declared freeze on 
new nuclear weapons production, under the condition that the United 
States and Russia commit to deeper reductions. The extent to which these 
ideas inform and influence official nuclear weapons policymaking in China 
is unclear. To complicate matters, China’s nuclear force modernisation, 
underway since the 1990s, is now starting to bear fruit under Xi Jinping,83 
a leader who is more confident in show-casing China’s nuclear weapons 
capability, especially in a domestic context. That said, as noted earlier 
here, Xi Jinping is invested in global nuclear diplomacy, especially of the 
multilateral variety from nuclear security to the P5 process. 
14.To conclude, four areas of future UK-China nuclear cooperation are 
proposed:
a. Like the UK, China has a record of making unilateral declarations on 
nuclear matters (China’s NFU is one example, the UK’s declaration of its 
nuclear arsenal size another). The UK could encourage China to issue a 
unilateral declaration on its arsenal size;
b. The UK has already engaged, successfully, with China in the P5 process 
and should continue to do so. China is especially engaged in this forum, 
having previously compiled a P5 glossary of nuclear terms,84 and now as 
chair (rotating) of this process. 
c. The UK has a strong record on verification. Given that China is outside the 
IPNDV, the UK could engage China in a separate verification process, 
perhaps linked to the UK-Norway initiative, or its successors, with a view 
to understanding China’s position on verification matters beyond its 
borders, specifically related to North Korea. China has displayed interest 
in verification yet seems to have limited experience of working on this 
issue in a multilateral forum beyond the P5 process (at present China has 
been working on verification through the China Academy for Engineering 
and Physics);
d. Dialogue, at various levels, to further explore issues of safety, security 
and command and control in relation to a sea-based nuclear deterrent. 
79 Liu Huaqiu, ‘Analysis of Nuclear Arms Control Policy’, Military Today, 11 November 1995.
80 Huang Hua reprinted in Ken Coates, China and the Bomb, (Nottingham: Humanities Press, 1986), pp.64-80. 
81 Beijing Review, ‘Qian Qichen’s speech at the UN disarmament session’, 13-19 June 1988, pp. 14-18.
82 For example, Li Bin, ‘China’s Potential to Contribute to Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament’, Arms Control Today, March 2011, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_03/LiBin 
83 Nicola Leveringhaus, ‘Developments in China’s Nuclear Policy’, IRSEM Research paper 31, 17 October 2016, 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/486547/7786646/file/NR_n31_2016.pdf ; and ‘Nuclear Weapons Policy and Diplomacy under Xi 
Jinping’, IRSEM Research Paper 46, 12 October 2017,  p. 4 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/514600/8663553/file/RP%20IRSEM%2046%20-
%20China%20Five%20Years%20of%20Xi%20Jinping,%20Juliette%20Genevaz.pdf 
84 P5 Glossary of Terms, via US State Department, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf 
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The Challenge of Universalizing Nonproliferation Norms 
Dr Adil Sultan Muhammad
Introduction
1. The NPT based global nonproliferation regime that is supported by various 
formal and informal arrangements, has helped limit the number of nuclear 
weapons states, but is now under increasing stress due to several internal 
and external challenges. If left unaddressed for a prolonged period, it may 
unravel the global nonproliferation regime. To deal with this clear and 
present danger there is a need to universalize the existing NPT based 
nonproliferation regime and discourage the new trends of negotiating 
parallel arrangements that would only lead to further divisions amongst 
the international community and make it difficult to achieve the goals of 
nonproliferation and global nuclear disarmament.  
Elements of the Global Nonproliferation Regime
2. The NPT is the central pillar of the global nonproliferation regime which is 
supported by various formal arrangements including the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), UNSCR 1540, etc, and other informal 
arrangements including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the other 
export control regimes. Collectively, these help in strengthening the global 
nonproliferation norms. Efforts to undermine any of these arrangements, 
such as granting country-specific exemptions to non-NPT state like India 
from the NSG guidelines is likely to create further dissent amongst the 
NPT as well as other non-NPT states, and would adversely impact upon 
the credibility of the NPT.      
Nuclear Risks
3. The risks of a nuclear exchange between major nuclear powers may have 
reduced but the chances of a nuclear use in a region like South Asia may 
have significantly increased due to the introduction of new war fighting 
doctrines and the ongoing nuclear modernization in both India and 
Pakistan. With a history of long outstanding disputes and mistrust a 
limited military conflict between India and Pakistan could lead to 
inadvertent escalation to a nuclear exchange with serious consequences 
for the international security.  
The NPT
4. The NPT is faced with several challenges including lack of progress by the 
NWS towards nuclear disarmament, Issues of internal non-compliance by 
NPT signatories (North Korea and Iran) and challenge by parallel and 
competing treaties (Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons). One of the  
most important one is the non-universal nature of the NPT and the failure 
to integrate the three non-signatory states (India, Pakistan and Israel into 
mainstream nonproliferation regime.
5. The three non-NPT nuclear states that never signed the NPT are unlikely 
to agree to unilateral concessions and give up their nuclear weapons, 
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unless offered with a tangible quid pro quo. This may require negotiating 
a new ‘bargain’ that could give recognition to their nuclear status in return 
for legally binding nonproliferation and disarmament obligations. 
Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia
6. The imminent demise of the INF Treaty that may also reduce the 
possibility of extension of the New Start Treaty, is a result mutual distrust 
and global leadership crisis. This could have adverse implications on other 
initiatives including the CTBT and the FMCT and developing an 
international consensus is likely to be more difficult. 
7. In view of the fact that the entry into force of the CTBT is difficult in the 
near future, there may be a value in encouraging regional powers to 
engage in bilateral arrangements. Pakistan in the recent past (2016) had 
offered a bilateral test ban treaty to India, and if both states could be 
encouraged to convert their respective unilateral moratoria into a legally 
binding bilateral arrangement, this would help the global nonproliferation 
and disarmament efforts. Pakistan had also offered to keep the region 
free of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems which was rejected by India. 
The recent purchase of S-400 system by India is likely to create further 
instability as Pakistan could take remedial measures to maintain the 
credibility of its deterrent.   
8. As the nuclear capabilities in South Asia are growing the nuclear doctrines 
are becoming fuzzier. Recent statements by the former senior members of 
India’s nuclear command authority indicate that India may be in the 
process of reviewing its nuclear doctrine and may have moved away from 
a posture of No First Use (NFU) and credible minimum deterrence’ (CMD) 
to ‘credible deterrence’. These developments are likely to force Pakistan to 
take countermeasures and lead to action-reaction phenomenon. India is in 
the process of operationalizing its nuclear triad which is likely to lead to a 
nuclear competition in the Indian Ocean.
Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNWs) and the Non-NPT 
States
9. TPNWs is likely to undermine the NPT as it brings duplicate obligations 
upon the signatory states with no clear roadmap for verification and 
implementation. States adhering to the NPT have different sets of 
obligations for the NWS and the NNWS, but the TPNWs makes no such 
distinction, thus bringing it in conflict with the NPT. TPNWs failure to make 
progress towards nuclear disarmament could lead to further 
disillusionment amongst the international community thus making the 
task of disarmament more difficult. 
 
10.TPNW offers no incentive for the non-NPT nuclear states to give up their 
nuclear weapons and join the new treaty. It is seen as another instrument 
to complicate the global nonproliferation regime. Unless the NPT outliers 
are made part of the global nonproliferation norms, it would be unrealistic 
to expect that any of these countries would agree to a binding 
commitment to work towards nuclear disarmament. 
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Role of UK 
11.There is a global leadership crisis on arms control and disarmament 
related issues. Other major players, including the UK have the opportunity 
and responsibility to fill this void and help restore international confidence 
by enhancing their engagement with all the major stakeholders and 
building a conducive environment of trust. 
12.The UK can also play more meaningful role in South Asia since it has 
better appreciation of India-Pakistan dispute due to its historic links with 
the region. The UK could encourage both regional nuclear powers to 
engage in bilateral arms control and confidence building measures while 
maintaining an objective and non-discriminatory approach, which is likely 
to improve regional security environment and reduce the incentive for 
both South Asian nuclear powers to remain engaged in an arms 
competition. 
13.Recommendations
a. There is a need to open a formal dialogue with the non-NPT states 
to explore the possibility of integrating these states into 
mainstream nonproliferation regime without necessarily amending 
the NPT.
b. The relatively new trends of treating non-NPT states differently 
based on political and commercial interests is likely to create 
further disillusionment amongst the NPT as well as the non-NPT 
states and must not be encouraged.
c. The UK because of its historical linkage with India and Pakistan 
could help facilitate the resumption of a dialogue process, to help 
reduce the risk of another conflict between the two countries.                                                                                                                                
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